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Abstract 
Firms need to incur substantial sunk costs to break in foreign markets, yet many give up exporting 
shortly after their first experience, which typically involves very small sales. Conversely, other new 
exporters shoot up their foreign sales and expand to new destinations. We investigate a simple 
theoretical mechanism that can rationalize these patterns. A firm discovers its profitability as an 
exporter only after actually engaging in exporting. The profitability is positively correlated over time 
and across foreign destinations. Accordingly, once the firm learns how good it is as an exporter, it 
adjusts quantities and decides whether to exit and whether to serve new destinations. Thus, it is the 
possibility of profitable expansion at both the intensive and extensive margins what makes incurring 
the sunk costs to enter a single foreign market worthwhile despite the high failure rates. Using a 
census of Argentinean firm-level manufacturing exports from 2002 to 2007, we find empirical support 
for several implications of our proposed mechanism, indicating that the practice of “sequential 
exporting” is pervasive. Sequential exporting has broad but subtle implications for trade policy. For 
example, a reduction in trade barriers in a country has delayed entry effects in its own market, while 
also promoting entry in other markets. This trade externality poses challenges for the quantification of 
the effects of trade liberalization programs, while suggesting neglected but critical implications of 
international trade agreements. 
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1 Introduction
How do firms break in foreign markets? To understand patterns of international trade and the
aggregate impact of trade liberalization, answering this question convincingly is of central impor-
tance. Recent trade theories (e.g. Melitz 2003) put great emphasis on the sunk costs firms have to
incur to start exporting, and existing estimates indicate that those costs can indeed be very high.1
The importance of sunk costs is however diﬃcult to reconcile with the patterns of entry in foreign
markets that recent empirical research has uncovered. For example, Eaton et al. (2008) show
evidence suggesting that Colombian firms often start exporting small quantities to a single neigh-
bor country, but almost half of them cease all exporting activities in less than a year. Those who
survive, on the other hand, tend to increase shipments to their current destinations, and a sizeable
fraction also expands to other markets. Similar patterns have been observed in other countries,2
including in our data set of Argentine exporters.
On the face of significant sunk costs to export and high initial failure rates, how can we explain
so much entry activity with so little initial sales? And what could explain the seemingly sequential
entry pattern of the surviving exporters? A possibility is that firms are uncertain about their success
as exporters. If a firm’s export profit in a market is correlated over time, then firms could enter in
a foreign market, even at a really small scale, to learn about their profit potential there today and
in the future. Furthermore, since breaking in new markets entails unrecoverable costs, firms could
enter a relatively "easy" market (e.g. a small neighbor) as a “testing ground” for future bolder
steps, such as serving the American or the European markets. This “experimentation” can explain
the sequential nature of entry across markets provided that the export profitability uncovered in
a particular market provides information about the firm’s profitability in other foreign markets.
This correlation of profitabilities across markets could be due to demand similarities or to firms’
characteristics that are associated with success in exporting, but which the firms themselves learn
only after actually engaging in exporting.
In this paper, we develop the simplest model that can formalize these ideas. The driving
assumption is that a firm’s success in foreign markets is uncertain, but that the uncertainty is
highly persistent over time and correlated across destinations. Despite its parsimony, our model
rationalizes several of the recently uncovered empirical findings in the literature on export dynamics,
such as the small size and the high exit rates of new exporters, as well as the rapid expansion of
those who survive, at both the intensive and the extensive margins. Our model also has a number
of specific empirical implications.
First, if indeed firms learn about their export profitability only once they have exported, then
1Das et al. (2007) structurally estimate sunk entry costs for Colombian manufacturers of leather products, knitted
fabrics, and basic chemicals to be at least $344,000 in 1986 U.S. dollars.
2Buono et al. (2008) confirm the findings of Eaton et al. (2008) in a detailed study of the intensive and extensive
margins of French exports. Lawless (2009a) carries out a similar exercise for a survey of Irish firms.
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those that survive should experience on average higher growth in their early exporting years than
in subsequent years. Moreover, if export profitabilities are positively correlated across destinations,
this high initial growth should be most pronounced in the first market the firm exports to, since
there is where the firm has most to learn. Second, the likelihood of breaking into new markets
should be higher for first-time exporters than for experienced ones, since the former have just
learned their export potential while the latter will enter new markets only if market conditions
change or if they experience positive productivity shocks. Third, exit from new markets should be
more likely for first-time exporters than for experienced ones, exactly as with entry.
We test these predictions using Argentine customs data comprising the universe of the country’s
manufacturing exports from 2002 to 2007, disaggregated by firm and destination country. We find
strong support for each of our predictions, even after controlling for firm heterogeneity and for
year-destination fixed eﬀects. Our model also implies that the dynamic behavior of new exporters
entering foreign destinations sequentially should be diﬀerent from the behavior of exporters starting
in multiple destinations, as well as from the behavior of firms that are returning to foreign markets.
We find convincing evidence that those diﬀerent types of firms do indeed behave diﬀerently over
time. Finally, we carry out additional robustness checks to isolate other factors that could be
driving some of our predictions; results remain qualitatively unchanged. Hence, while uncertainty
correlated across time and markets is but one possible force shaping firms’ export strategies, our
evidence indicates that it plays an unequivocal role. For brevity, we refer to the implications of
this uncertainty for exporting firms simply as "sequential exporting."
The policy implications of sequential exporting are far-reaching. Consider the impact of trade
liberalization in diﬀerent countries for the firms of a "Home" country. When a nearby country
lowers its trade barriers, it attracts new exporting firms from Home. As these new exporters learn
about their ability to serve foreign markets, some endure unsuccessful experiences while others
realize that they are capable of serving foreign markets very profitably. The former group gives up
exporting, whereas the latter expands to other foreign destinations. As a result, trade liberalization
in the nearby country not only promotes entry in that market; it also induces entry in third markets,
albeit with a lag. Similarly, the reduction of trade barriers in a distant country initially induces
entry of some Home firms in the markets of Home’s neighbors. Put simply, lower trade barriers in
the distant country raise the value of an eventual entry there; this enhances the value of “export
experimentation,” thereby fostering entry in third markets in the short run. Once some of the
entrants realize a high export potential from their experience in the neighbors’ markets, they move
on to the market of the liberalizing country.
Thus, our findings suggest the existence of a trade externality : lower trade barriers in a country
induce entry of foreign firms in other markets. This could provide a motive for international coor-
dination of trade policies that is very diﬀerent from those often emphasized by trade economists.3
In this sense, our proposed mechanism has the potential to oﬀer the basis for a new rationale for
3See Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for a general discussion of the motivations for international trade policy coordi-
nation.
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global trade institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). If the trade externality were
stronger at the regional level, it could also help to explain the pattern of regional trade agreements
throughout the world.
If fact, our model suggests that the impact of trade agreements could be very distinct from
what existing studies indicate. For example, a regional trade agreement would boost export ex-
perimentation by lowering the costs of accessing the markets of bloc partners. As a result of more
experimentation, a greater number of domestic firms would eventually find it profitable to export
also to bloc outsiders. In that sense, regional integration generates a type of “trade creation” that
is very diﬀerent from the concept economists often emphasize: in addition to promoting intra-
bloc trade, a regional trading bloc should also stimulate exports to non-member countries. If the
agreement were of the multilateral type, tracking down its eﬀects becomes even trickier.
Third-country and lagged eﬀects of trade liberalization can also be useful to explain an enduring
puzzle in the trade literature: while world trade has almost quadrupled in the last fifty years, tariﬀs
on manufactured goods in developed countries have fallen during the same period by little more
than ten percentage points. Attempts to explaining this phenomenon, for example by exploring
the rise of vertical specialization (Yi 2003), remain quantitatively unsatisfactory.4 But if correlated
export profitability explains observed sequential export entry, tariﬀ reductions could have much
larger impacts on global trade flows than existing models suggest. Third-country and delayed
eﬀects could also help to explain the diﬃculty in identifying significant trade eﬀects of multilateral
liberalization undertaken under the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade and the WTO (Rose
2004), which contrasts with the entrenched beliefs that the GATT/WTO system has been crucial
in promoting international trade. Similarly, those eﬀects hint that the gains from trade may extend
well beyond the static gains typically emphasized in the literature.
The growing documentation of the pattern of firms’ foreign sales has been fostering increasing
research interest on the dynamics of firms’ exporting strategies.5 The current work of Eaton et al.
(2009) and Freund and Pierola (2009), who emphasize learning mechanisms, are closely related to
ours. Eaton et al. develop a model where producers learn about the appeal of their products in a
market by devoting resources to finding consumers and by observing the experiences of competitors.
Freund and Pierola also consider a single export market, but with product-specific uncertainty, as
their focus is on the incentives of firms to develop new products for exporting. Using data on
exports of non-traditional agricultural products in Peru, Freund and Pierola uncover interesting
4For instance, Yi (2003) concludes that vertical specialization can resolve at most fifty percent of the excessive
responsiveness of trade flows to trade barriers. Ornelas and Turner (2008) argue that oﬀshoring under contract
incompleteness is also likely to play a role in explaining this puzzle.
5Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) develop a model where potential exporters are uncertain about country-
specific fixed export costs, but learn about them from other firms in the industry that start exporting to the same
market. This idea is related to Hausmann and Rodrik’s (2003) earlier insight that ex ante unknown export oppor-
tunities can be gauged from the experience of export pioneers, who eﬀectively provide a public good to the rest of
the industry. Unlike those authors, who focus on learning from rivals, we are interested in individual self-discovery.
Das et al. (2007) develop a structural model of firm heterogeneity and export dynamics to quantify the value of the
sunk costs of exporting. Arkolakis (2009) proposes a model with increasing market penetration costs, where a firm’s
productivity evolves over time according to an exogenous stochastic process. This process determines the firm’s entry,
exit and production decisions in foreign markets.
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patterns of trial and error based on the frequency of entry and exit from foreign markets. Unlike
here, in those models uncertainty is destination-specific, and the focus is on the export dynamics
within a market, without distinction between first and subsequent markets.
Our work is also related to other recent empirical findings at the product and country levels.
Evenett and Venables (2002) document a "geographic spread of exports" for 23 developing countries
between 1970 and 1997, in the sense that importing a product from a certain country is more likely if
the origin country is supplying the same product to nearby markets. Besedes and Prusa (2006) find
that the median duration of exporting a product to the United States is very short, with a hazard
rate that decreases sharply over time. This is confirmed by Iacovone and Javorcik’s (2010) study
on the decision of Mexican firms to export to the U.S. after NAFTA’s implementation. Alvarez
et al. (2008) find evidence from Chilean firms that exporting a product to a country increases
the likelihood of selling the same product to another foreign market. Bernard et al. (2009) study
U.S. firms and show that the extensive margins of trade are key to explain variation in trade at
long intervals, but that the intensive margin is responsible for most short-run (i.e. year-to-year)
variation. These varying contributions of extensive and intensive margins at diﬀerent intervals
reflect the fact that new exporters start small but grow fast and also expand to other markets if
they survive. Our model helps to rationalize some of these findings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. In Section
3 we use Argentine customs data to test the distinguishing features of our theoretical mechanism.
In Section 4 we develop the impact of trade liberalization under our mechanism and the resulting
policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Basic structure
We consider the decision of a risk-neutral producer to serve two segmented foreign markets, A
and B. Countries A and B are symmetric except for the unit trade costs that the Home firm
must pay to export there, denoted by τA and τB, τA ≤ τB. To sell in each foreign market, the
firm needs to incur in a one-time fixed cost, F ≥ 0. This corresponds to the costs of establishing
distribution channels, of designing a marketing strategy, of learning about exporting procedures,
of familiarization with the institutional and policy characteristics of the foreign country etc.
Variable costs comprise two elements: an unknown export unit cost, cj , and a unit production
cost that is known to the firm. For convenience, we normalize the latter to zero. In subsection 2.3
we show that allowing for diﬀerences in productivity has no qualitative consequences for our main
mechanism. The producer faces the following demand in each market j = A,B:
qj(pj) = dj − pj , (1)
where qj denotes the output sold in destination j, pj denotes the corresponding price, and dj is an
4
unknown parameter.
We therefore allow for uncertainty in both demand and supply parameters. Let
μj ≡ dj − cj
be a random variable with a continuous cumulative distribution function G(·) on the support [μ, μ].
We refer to μj as the firm’s "export profitability" in market j. μ obtains when the highest possible
demand intercept (d) and the lowest possible export unit cost (c) are realized; μ obtains under the
opposite extreme scenario (dj = d and cj = c). The analysis becomes interesting when trade costs
are such that, upon the resolution of uncertainty, it may become optimal to serve both, only one,
or none of the markets. Accordingly, we assume μ < τA–so that exporting may not be worthwhile
even if F = 0–and 2F 1/2 + τB < μ. This last condition implies that exporting may be profitable
even in the distant market. To ensure that equilibrium prices are always strictly positive, we need
that Eμ < 2dj for all dj , so we assume throughout the paper that d > 12Eμ.
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Our central assumption is that export profitability is correlated over time and across markets.
Correlation of export profitability over time reflects, first, the fact that the structure of demand a
firm faces in a market, while likely unknown ex ante, tends to be persistent.7 Furthermore, the same
is true for the idiosyncratic component of some export costs, which a firm learns only after actually
engaging in exports but that do not change much over time. For example, shipping and other port
activities, maintenance of an international division within the firm, distribution of goods in foreign
markets, compliance with requirements of financial services, as well as the handling and processing
of the documents necessary for exporting–all these activities involve relatively stable idiosyncratic
costs that are often unknown to the firm until it actually starts exporting.8 Similarly, cross-country
correlations in export profitability can come from similarities across countries either in demand
or supply conditions. The patterns uncovered by gravity equations–which show that bilateral
trade correlates strongly with indicators for language, religion, colonial origin etc.–suggest that
demand similarities across countries can be significant.9 Likewise, some of the initially unknown
6In an online addendum (http://www.economics.soton.ac.uk/staﬀ/calvo/documents/Technical_Addendum_2.pdf)
we show that adopting instead a demand function of the form qj(pj) = max
?
dj − pj , 0
?
leaves our results unaﬀected.
We adopt the assumption d > 1
2
Eμ here for simplicity.
7Trade facilitation agencies do indeed place a heavy emphasis on the importance of uncovering foreign demand
for would-be exporters, and their advices indicate that the key uncertainty is about persistent demand components
(see for example the discussion of SITPRO, the British trade facilitation agency, at http://www.sitpro.org.uk).
8Even important but relatively straightforward tasks related to exporting are often performed very poorly–
implying high costs–by some firms. For example, SITPRO points out that “well in excess of 50% of docu-
ments presented by exporters to banks for payment under letters of credit are rejected on first presentation”
(http://www.sitpro.org.uk). This figure includes new as well as old exporters. And such mistakes can be quite
costly, since “slight discrepancies or omissions may prevent merchandise from being exported, result in nonpayment,
or even in the seizure of the exporter’s goods by [. . . ] customs” (U.S. International Trade Administration, “A Basic
Guide to Exporting,” http://www.unzco.com/basicguide). Arguably, firms learn how well they can perform such
export-specific activities only after they actually engage in them.
9Buono et al. (2008) show evidence consistent with persistent market characteristics driving firms’ choices of
export destinations. Kee and Krishna (2008) argue that market-, but also firm-specific demand shocks can help
reconcile the predictions of heterogeneous firms models with detailed micro evidence. Demidova et al. (2009) confirm
this when studying how variations in American and European trade policies vis-à-vis Bangladeshi apparel products
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idiosyncratic export costs mentioned above involve the general business of exporting, implying a
correlation across markets.
To make the analysis as clear and simple as possible, we focus on the limiting case. First, as
the definition of μj without time subscripts indicates, we consider that the μj ’s are constant over
time. Second, we look at the case where the draws of μj are perfectly correlated across markets:
μA = μB = μ. Each of these assumptions can be relaxed. All of our qualitative results generalize
to any strictly positive correlation of export profitabilities across markets and time. In Appendix
B we show this for the case where μj ’s are positively but imperfectly correlated.
Since our main goal is to understand entry into foreign markets, we evaluate all profits from an
ex ante perspective, i.e. at their t = 0 expected value. For simplicity we do not consider a discount
factor, but this has no bearing on our qualitative results. We denote by ejt the firm’s decision to
enter market j at time t, j = A,B, t = 1, 2. Thus, ejt = 1 if the firm enters market j (i.e. pays
the sunk cost) at t, ejt = 0 otherwise. Output q
j
t can be strictly positive only if either e
j
t = 1 or
ejt−1 = 1.
The timing is as follows:
t = 1: At period 1, the firm decides whether to enter each market. If the firm decides to enter market
j, it pays the per-destination fixed entry cost F and chooses how much to sell there in that
period, qj1. At the end of period 1, export profits in destination j are realized. If the firm has
entered and produced qj1 ≥ ε, where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small, it infers μ from its profit.
t = 2: At period 2, if the firm has entered market j at t = 1, it chooses how much to sell in that
market, qj2. If the firm has not entered destination j at t = 1, it decides whether to enter that
market. If the firm enters, it pays F and chooses qj2. At the end of period 2, export profits
are realized.
Notice that the firm’s export profitability parameter μ is not directly observed but inferred by
the firm from its profits. To learn μ the firm must pay the fixed entry cost F and export a strictly
positive quantity to one of the markets. This is reminiscent of Jovanovic’s (1982) model, although
a central diﬀerence is that we consider entry into several destinations.
Uncovering μ must be costly, or else all firms would, counterfactually, export at least a tiny
quantity to gather their export potential. We rely on previous findings in the literature and model
this cost as a sunk cost, but this is not necessary for our results. Alternatively, one could specify that
a firm needs a minimum scale of experimentation to reliably uncover its true export profitability.
We allow this minimum scale to be an arbitrarily small number (ε) because we require the firm to
spend F to sell in a foreign market, but one could also assume the opposite (i.e. set F = 0 and
require a larger minimum scale).10
aﬀect firms’ choices of export destinations.
10The specific type of experimentation chosen by the exporter is not the focus of this paper. For a more general
analysis of experimentation, see for example the model of Aghion et al. (1991), where a Bayesian decision maker
with an unknown objective function engages into costly experimentation, provided that it is informative enough.
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In reality, entry may also be "passive," where a foreign buyer posts an order and the exporting
firm simply delivers it. Trade in intermediate goods, for example, is indeed often importer-driven,
rather than exporter-driven. Thus, in general firms may either deliberately choose to enter a
market, as in our model, or simply wait until they are chosen by a foreign buyer. Importantly, both
ways of exporting help to resolve uncertainty. Initially passive exporters may therefore become
active, and pay entry costs, if upon delivery of their first foreign order they learn about their future
export profitability. Since our predictions apply to export activity after a first experience, they
would remain valid even when that first experience is "passive."
2.2 A Firm’s Export Decision
Export profitability correlated across time and markets implies that exporting to country A reveals
information about the firm’s export performance in country B. As a result, there are three undom-
inated entry strategies. The firm may enter both markets simultaneously at t = 1 ("simultaneous
entry"); enter only market A at t = 1, deciding at t = 2 whether to enter market B ("sequential
entry"); or enter neither market. The other two possibilities, of entering both markets only at t = 2
and of entering market B before market A, need not be considered. The latter is dominated by
entering market A before market B, since τA ≤ τB. The former is dominated by simultaneous
entry at t = 1, since by postponing entry the producer is faced with the same problem as in t = 1,
but is left with a shorter horizon to recoup identical fixed entry costs.
We solve for the firm’s decision variables {ej1, ej2, qj1, qj2} using backward induction. We denote
optimal quantities in period t under simultaneous entry by bqjt , and under sequential entry by eqjt .
2.2.1 Period t = 2
i) No entry. The firm does not export, earning zero profit.
ii) Simultaneous entry. When the firm exports to both destinations at t = 1, at t = 2 it will
have inferred its export profitability μ and will choose its export volumes by solving
max
qj2≥0
n
(μ− τ j − qj2)q
j
2
o
, j = A,B.
This yields bqj2(τ j) = 1{μ>τj}µμ− τ j2
¶
, (2)
where 1{.} represents the indicator function, here denoting whether μ > τ j . Second-period output
is zero for low μ. Profits at t = 2, expressed in t = 0 expected terms, can then be written as
V (τ j) =
Z μ
τj
µ
μ− τ j
2
¶2
dG(μ), j = A,B.
Function V (τ j) represents the firm’s option value of keeping exporting to market j after learning
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its profitability in foreign markets. If the firm cannot deliver positive profits in a market, it exits
to avoid further losses. Otherwise, the firm tunes up its output choice to that market.
iii) Sequential entry. When the firm exports to country A in t = 1, at t = 2 it will have inferred
its export profitability μ. Thus, qA2 is again given by (2): eqA2 (τA) = bqA2 (τA) = 1{μ>τA} ³μ−τA2 ´,
generating second-period profit V (τA).
The firm chooses to enter market B at t = 2 if the operational profit is greater than the sunk
cost to enter that market. This will be the case when the firm realizes its export profitability is
large relative to the sunk cost: µ
μ− τB
2
¶2
≥ F . (3)
Hence, the firm’s entry decision in market B at t = 2 is
eB2 (τ
B) = 1⇔ μ ≥ 2F 1/2 + τB. (4)
Thus, defining FB2 (τ
B) as the F that solves (3) with equality, the firm enters market B at t = 2 if
F ≤ FB2 (τB). It is straightforward to see that FB2 (τB) is strictly decreasing in τB.
If the firm enters market B, it will choose qB2 much like it chooses q
A
2 , adjusted for market B’s
specific trade cost, τB. However, conditional on eB2 = 1, we know that μ > τ
B. Therefore, the firm
sets eqB2 (τB) = μ−τB2 .
Expressed in t = 0 expected terms, the firm’s profit from (possibly) entering market B at t = 2
corresponds to
W (τB;F ) ≡
Z μ
2F 1/2+τB
"µ
μ− τB
2
¶2
− F
#
dG(μ)
=
(
V (τB)−
Z 2F 1/2+τB
τB
µ
μ− τB
2
¶2
dG(μ)
)
− F
h
1−G(2F 1/2 + τB)
i
.
Function W (τB;F ) represents the firm’s option value of exporting to market B after learning
its profitability in foreign markets by entering market A first. The expression in curly brackets
represents the (ex ante) expected operational profit from entering market B at t = 2. The other
term represents the sunk cost from entering B times the probability that this happens.
Thus, the return from first entering destination A includes the option value of subsequently
becoming an exporter to destination B without incurring the costs from directly "testing" that
market. Naturally, this option has value because export profitabilities are correlated across des-
tinations. If export profitabilities were independent, W (τB;F ) = 0 and there would not be any
gain from entering export markets sequentially. In Appendix B we show that if the correlation is
positive but less than perfect, the value of the option falls but remains strictly positive.
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2.2.2 Period t = 1
i) No entry. The firm does not export, earning zero profit.
ii) Simultaneous entry. A firm exporting to both destinations at t = 1 chooses qA1 and q
B
1 to
maximize gross profits:
ΨSm(qA1 , q
B
1 ; τ
A, τB) ≡
Z μ
μ
(μ− τA − qA1 )qA1 dG(μ) +
Z μ
μ
(μ− τB − qB1 )qB1 dG(μ)
+max
n
1{qA1 >0},1{qB1 >0}
o £
V (τA) + V (τB)
¤
, (5)
where superscript Sm stands for “simultaneous” entry. The first two terms correspond to the firm’s
period 1 per-destination operational profits. The third term denotes how much the firm expects
to earn in period 2, depending on whether either qA1 > 0 or q
B
1 > 0. Since exporting to one
market provides the firm information on its export profitability in both markets, it is enough to
have exported a positive amount in period 1 to either destination.
Maximization of (5) yields outputs
bqA1 (τA) = 1{Eμ>τA}µEμ− τA2
¶
+ 1{Eμ≤τA}ε, (6)
bqB1 (τB) = 1{Eμ>τB}µEμ− τB2
¶
, (7)
where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small number. To understand these expressions, notice that there are
three possibilities. If Eμ > τB, qj1 =
Eμ−τj
2 for j = A,B is clearly optimal. If τ
B ≥ Eμ > τA,
qA1 =
Eμ−τA
2 and q
B
1 = 0 is the best choice. If Eμ ≤ τA, setting qA1 = qB1 = 0 may appear
optimal. However, inspection of (5) makes clear that a small but strictly positive qA1 = ε > 0
dominates that option, since ΨSm(ε, 0; τA, τB) =
¡
Eμ− τA − ε
¢
ε + V (τA) + V (τB) > 0. Clearly,
setting qA1 = q
B
1 = 0 forgoes the benefit from uncovering an informative signal of the firm’s export
profitability in B.
Define Ψ(τ j) ≡ 1{Eμ>τj}
³
Eμ−τj
2
´2
+ V (τ j). Evaluating (5) at the optimal output choices (6),
(7) and (2), we obtain the firm’s expected gross profit from simultaneous entry:
ΨSm(τA, τB) ≡ lim
ε→0
ΨSm(bqA1 (τA), bqB1 (τB); τA, τB) = Ψ(τA) +Ψ(τB). (8)
iii) Sequential entry. At t = 1, a firm that enters only market A chooses qA1 to maximize
ΨSq(qA1 ; τ
A, τB) ≡
Z μ
μ
(μ− τA − qA1 )qA1 dG(μ) + 1{qA1 >0}
£
V (τA) +W (τB;F )
¤
, (9)
where Sq stands for "sequential" entry. The firm learns its export profitability iﬀ qA1 > 0. A strictly
positive quantity allows the firm to make a more informed entry decision in market B at t = 2,
according to (4). Clearly, the solution to this program is eqA1 (τA) = bqA1 (τA), as in (6).
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Figure 1: The Profit Function from Sequential Exporting when Eμ < τA
Our model therefore suggests that some firms will “test” foreign markets before fully exploring
them (or exiting them altogether), a feature consistent with the empirical findings discussed in the
Introduction. Interestingly, experimentation can arise even when the variable trade cost is large
enough to make expected operational profits at t = 1 negative, and despite the existence of sunk
costs to export. Intuitively, the firm can choose to incur the sunk cost and a small initial operational
loss because it knows that it may be competitive in that foreign market as well as in others; the
return from the initial sale allows the firm to find out whether it actually is.
Figure 1 illustrates this point by showing a situation where export experimentation is worthwhile
even though Eμ < τA. The lowest curve represents the profit of entering market A when experi-
mentation is useless. The middle curve adds the value of experimentation in the entry market; the
highest curve includes also the value of experimentation across markets. In the figure, experimenta-
tion is worthwhile only because it has value in the other market; otherwise the value of information
would not be high enough to compensate for the sunk costs [i.e., V (τA)+W (τB;F ) > F > V (τA)].
Evaluating (9) at the optimal output choice eqA1 (τA), we obtain the firm’s expected profit from
sequential entry:
ΨSq(τA, τB) ≡ lim
ε→0+
ΨSq(eqA1 (τA); τA, τB) = Ψ(τA) +W (τB;F ). (10)
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2.2.3 Entry strategy
We can now fully characterize the firm’s entry strategy. Using (8), the firm’s net profit from
simultaneous entry, ΠSm, is
ΠSm = Ψ(τA) +Ψ(τB)− 2F . (11)
In turn, we have from (10) that the firm’s net profit from sequential entry, ΠSq, is
ΠSq = Ψ(τA) +W (τB;F )− F . (12)
Simultaneous entry is optimal if ΠSm > ΠSq and ΠSm ≥ 0. Conversely, sequential entry is
optimal if ΠSq ≥ ΠSm and ΠSq ≥ 0. If neither set of conditions is satisfied, the firm does not enter
any market. Using (11) and (12), we can rewrite these conditions as follows. Simultaneous entry
is optimal if (
F < Ψ(τB)−W (τB;F ) and
F ≤
£
Ψ(τA) +Ψ(τB)
¤
/2.
Notice that the right-hand side of the second inequality above is strictly greater than the right-hand
side of the first inequality, since W (τB;F ) > 0 and τA ≤ τB. Intuitively, if F is small enough to
make simultaneous entry preferred to sequential entry, it also makes simultaneous entry preferred
to no entry at all. Thus, simultaneous entry is optimal if
F < Ψ(τB)−W (τB;F ). (13)
In turn, sequential entry is optimal if
Ψ(τB)−W (τB;F ) ≤ F ≤ Ψ(τA) +W (τB;F ). (14)
Inequalities (13) and (14) define the firm’s entry strategy at t = 1. The firm enters market A
at t = 1 if either (13) or (14) are satisfied; it enters market B at t = 1 if (13) is satisfied but (14)
is not:
eA1 (τ
A, τB) = 1⇔ F ≤ Ψ(τA) +W (τB;F ), (15)
eB1 (τ
B) = 1⇔ F < Ψ(τB)−W (τB;F ). (16)
Naturally, the condition for eB1 = 1 is stricter than the condition for e
A
1 = 1. Condition (16) implies
that eB1 = 1 (in which case simultaneous entry occurs) only if the sunk cost to export is suﬃciently
small. The following proposition shows this and other results that fully characterize the firm’s
export decision.
Proposition 1 There are numbers FSq and FSm, with FSq > FSm ≥ 0, such that at t = 1 the
firm enters both markets A and B if F < FSm, enters only market A if F ∈ [FSm, FSq], and enters
neither market if F > FSq. Moreover, FSm > 0 iﬀ Eμ > τB. When F ∈ [FSm, FSq], at t = 2 the
firm enters market B if it learns that condition (4) is satisfied.
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Proof. Rewrite condition (16) for eB1 = 1 as
F +W (τB;F ) < Ψ(τB). (17)
The right-hand side of (17) is independent of F , whereas the left-hand side is strictly increasing in
F . To see that, use Leibniz’s rule to find that
∂
£
F +W (τB;F )
¤
∂F
= 1−
Z μ
2F 1/2+τB
dG(μ)
= G(2F 1/2 + τB) > 0. (18)
Defining FSm as the F that would turn (17) into an equality, eB1 = 1 if F < F
Sm. However,
FSm = 0 if Eμ ≤ τB, since in that case (17) becomes
F +
Z μ
2F 1/2+τB
"µ
μ− τB
2
¶2
− F
#
dG(μ) <
Z μ
τB
µ
μ− τB
2
¶2
dG(μ).
This expression becomes an equality when F = 0. Given (18), it follows that it does not hold for
any F > 0.
Next rewrite condition (15) for eA1 = 1 as
F −W (τB;F ) ≤ Ψ(τA). (19)
The right-hand side of (19) is independent of F , whereas it is straightforward to see that the left-
hand side is strictly increasing in F . Thus, defining FSq as the F that solves (19) with equality,
eA1 = 1 if F ≤ FSq. Since FSm is the value of F that leaves the firm indiﬀerent between a sequential
and a simultaneous entry strategy [i.e. ΠSq(FSm) = ΠSm(FSm) > 0], while FSq is the value of F
that leaves the firm indiﬀerent between sequential entry and no entry [i.e. ΠSq(FSq) = 0], because
profits are decreasing in the value of the sunk entry cost, ∂ΠSq(F )/∂F = G(2F 1/2 + τB)− 2 < 0,
it follows that FSq > FSm.
Finally, since the firm learns μ at t = 1 when F ∈ [FSm, FSq], it enters market B at t = 2
according to (4).
The intuition for these results is simple. By construction τA ≤ τB, so if the firm ever enters any
foreign market, it will enter market A. Since there are gains from resolving the uncertainty about
export profitability, entry in market A, if it happens, will take place in the first period. Provided
that the firm enters country A, it can also enter country B in the first period or wait to learn its
export profitability before going to market B. If the firm enters market B at t = 1, it earns the
expected operational profit in that market in the first period. Naturally, this can make sense only
when the operational profit in B is expected to be positive (Eμ > τB). By postponing entry the
firm forgoes that profit but saves the entry sunk cost if it realizes its export profitability is not
suﬃciently high. The size of the sunk cost has no bearing on the former, but increases the latter.
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Figure 2: Optimal Entry Strategy (Eμ > τB)
Hence, the higher the sunk cost to export, the more beneficial is waiting before sinking F in the
less profitable market, B.
Figure 2 illustrates this result when Eμ > τB, in which case simultaneous entry is optimal for
small enough F . Notice that trade cost τB aﬀects both thresholds, while trade cost τA only aﬀects
FSq. Thus, we can denote the thresholds as FSq(τA, τB) and FSm(τB). We characterize how trade
costs aﬀect each of the thresholds in Section 4.
2.3 Diﬀerences in productivity
We have developed the analysis so far without mentioning how diﬀerences in productivity would
aﬀect our results. Yet the large and growing literature spurred by Melitz (2003) emphasizes that
productivity diﬀerences are key to explain firms’ export behavior. As we now show, they matter in
our analysis too, but in a rather straightforward way.
To allow for diﬀerences in productivity, we denote a firm’s unit costs as 1ϕ + c, where ϕ ∈ [0,∞)
denotes the firm’s (known) eﬃciency in production (i.e. its measure of productivity) and c again
reflects its (unknown) unit export cost. It is easy to see, for example, that more productive firms
will sell larger quantities (and expect higher profits) in the destinations they serve. More important
for our purposes is how diﬀerences in productivity aﬀect entry patterns in foreign markets. The
following proposition shows that the more productive a firm is, the less stringent the start-up fixed
entry thresholds FSq and FSm become.
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Proposition 2 FSq and FSm are increasing in productivity ϕ.
Proof. Rewrite condition (16) for eB1 = 1 as
F < Ψ(τB +
1
ϕ
)−W (τB + 1
ϕ
;F ). (20)
Analogously to Proposition 1, FSm = 0 if Eμ ≤ τB + 1ϕ , in which case
dFSm
dϕ = 0. Otherwise, the
expression above rewritten as an equality defines FSm implicitly:
FSm =
∙
Ψ(τB +
1
ϕ
)−W (τB + 1
ϕ
;FSm)
¸
,
or equivalently,
FSm =
Ã
Eμ− τB − 1ϕ
2
!2
+
Z μ
τB+ 1ϕ
Ã
μ− τB − 1ϕ
2
!2
dG(μ)
−
Z μ
2(FSm)1/2+τB+ 1ϕ
⎡
⎣
Ã
μ− τB − 1ϕ
2
!2
− FSm
⎤
⎦ dG(μ).
Totally diﬀerentiating this expression and manipulating it, we find
dFSm
dϕ
=
∂Ψ(τB + 1ϕ)/∂ϕ− ∂W (τB +
1
ϕ ;F
Sm)/∂ϕ
1 + ∂W (τB + 1ϕ ;F
Sm)/∂F
=
(Eμ− τB − 1ϕ) +
R 2[FSm]1/2+τB+ 1ϕ
τB+ 1ϕ
(μ− τB − 1ϕ)dG(μ)
2ϕ2G(2 [FSm]1/2 + τB + 1ϕ)
> 0.
Next rewrite condition (15) for eA1 = 1 as
F ≤ Ψ(τA + 1
ϕ
) +W (τB +
1
ϕ
;F ). (21)
This expression defines FSq implicitly when it holds with equality:
FSq = Ψ(τA +
1
ϕ
) +W (τB +
1
ϕ
;FSq),
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or equivalently,
FSq = 1{Eμ>τA+ 1ϕ}
Ã
Eμ− τA − 1ϕ
2
!2
+
Z μ
τA+ 1ϕ
Ã
μ− τA − 1ϕ
2
!2
dG(μ)
+
Z μ
2(FSq)1/2+τB+ 1ϕ
⎡
⎣
Ã
μ− τB − 1ϕ
2
!2
− FSq
⎤
⎦ dG(μ).
Totally diﬀerentiating this expression and manipulating it, we find
dFSq
dϕ
=
∂Ψ(τA + 1ϕ)/∂ϕ+ ∂W (τ
B + 1ϕ ;F
Sq)/∂ϕ
1− ∂W (τB + 1ϕ ;FSq)/∂F
=
1
2ϕ2
h
2−G(2 [FSq]1/2 + τB + 1ϕ)
i × ∙1{Eμ>τA+ 1ϕ}
µ
Eμ− τA − 1
ϕ
¶
+
+
Z μ
τA+ 1ϕ
(μ− τA − 1
ϕ
)dG(μ) +
Z μ
2[FSq ]1/2+τB+ 1ϕ
(μ− τB − 1
ϕ
)dG(μ)
#
> 0,
completing the proof.
Thus, varying productivity levels shift the thresholds defining sequential and simultaneous entry
in foreign markets in an unambiguous way. Higher productivity increases the expected profits from
entering foreign markets simultaneously, as well as the expected profits from exporting at all.
The entry strategies can nevertheless still be characterized by the sunk cost thresholds. The only
diﬀerence is that the more productive a firm is, the higher its sunk cost thresholds will be, implying
that more productive firms are more likely to export, and to start exporting simultaneously to
multiple destinations.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 2. Notice first that, if productivity is too low (ϕ < 1μ−τA ),
there is no hope of making profits through exporting, and therefore the firm does not enter any
foreign market even if F = 0. Similarly, the firm would never enter simultaneously if it did not
expect to make positive operational profits in market B (i.e. if ϕ < 1Eμ−τB ). By contrast, observe
that as the unit production cost falls to zero (i.e. ϕ→∞), the thresholds approach those defined
in Proposition 1. Given this qualitative similarity, in the remaining of the paper we keep the
specification where we normalize unit production costs to zero, while bearing in mind that they are
aﬀected by productivity levels.
2.4 Testable implications
Our model is parsimonious in many dimensions. But it is straightforward to extend it to T > 2
periods and N > 2 foreign countries, so we can derive testable predictions for the intensive and the
extensive (both entry and exit) margins of exporting. We assume throughout that F is ‘moderate,’
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Figure 3: Optimal Entry Strategy with Varying Productivity
so that sequential exporting is optimal.11 We maintain the convention that τA = min{τ j}, j =
A, ...,N , so that market A is the first the firm enters at t = 1.
In the basic formulation of our model, firms learn fully about their profitability in exporting
to market j by selling at market i, i 6= j. In truth, the correlation of export profitabilities across
markets is surely less than perfect. However, if it is not negligible, our main messages remain intact
(Appendix B). The same is true about correlation of export profitabilities in a given market over
time. Eﬀectively, our running hypothesis is that the highest informational content is extracted from
the first export experience. Our predictions should be interpreted accordingly.
Our model predicts, first, that conditional on survival we should expect faster intensive margin
export growth when firms are learning their export profitabilities–i.e. right after they enter their
first foreign market.
Prediction 1 (Intensive margin) Conditional on survival, the growth of a firm’s exports to a
market is on average highest between the first and second periods in the first foreign market served
by the firm.
Proof. Consider the first market, A. Conditional on entry, export volume at t = 1 is given by (6).
At t = 2, the firm decides to stay active there if μ > τA, and in that case produces qA2 =
μ−τA
2 . Ex
11 In practice, entry in foreign markets is indeed always "sequential" to some extent, as no firm in our sample enters
all possible markets within a single year.
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post quantities conditional on survival are distributed according to G(·|μ > τA). It follows that the
average surviving firm will produce the ex ante expected quantity E0(qA2
¯¯
μ > τA) = E0(μ|μ>τ
A)−τA
2 .
There are two cases. If Eμ ≤ τA, export growth from first to second year is σA ≡ E0(μ|μ>τ
A)−τA
2 −
ε > 0. Otherwise, σA = E0(μ|μ>τ
A)−τA
2 −
Eμ−τA
2 =
1
2 [E0(μ|μ > τA)− Eμ]. Lemma 2 in Appendix
A shows that this inequality is strictly positive. Hence, conditional on survival, the firm expects to
increase its export volume to market A in the second period. In all subsequent periods expected
growth in market A conditional on survival is nil, since E0(qAt
¯¯
μ > τA) = E0(μ|μ>τ
A)−τA
2 for all
t > 1.
Consider now foreign market j, j 6= A. Since the firm enters market j only if μ > 2F 1/2 + τ j ,
E0(q
j
t+1
¯¯¯
μ > 2F 1/2 + τ j) = E0(q
j
t
¯¯¯
μ > 2F 1/2 + τ j) = E0(μ|μ>2F
1/2+τj)−τj
2 for all t > 1. Thus,
export growth in market j is nil in all periods. Hence, export growth is on average highest in
market A between the first and second years of exporting.
The intuition for this result is simple. Since export profitability is uncertain for a firm before
it starts exporting, first-year exports are relatively low. If the firm anticipates positive variable
profit in its first market, it produces according to this expectation. If the firm stays there in
the second period, it must be because its uncovered export potential is relatively high (μ > τA).
Therefore, conditional on survival, on average the firm expands sales in its first market, as the
relevant distribution of μ is a truncation of the original one. If the firm had entered that market just
to learn about its export potential (and to potentially benefit from expanding to other destinations
in the future), the firm initially produces just the minimum necessary for eﬀective learning and
the same argument applies even more strongly. On the other hand, once the uncertainty about
export profitability has been resolved, there is no reason for further changes in sales, and there
should be no growth in export volumes in the years following this discovery period. Similarly, since
the profitability of the firm in its first export destination conveys all information about export
profitability in other destinations, there is no reason for export growth in markets other than the
firm’s first either.
Obviously, our basic model delivers these results too bluntly. It abstracts from a range of shocks
that are likely to aﬀect the firm’s output choices and growth; we seek to control for those in our
empirical analysis. There are also other reasons to expect export growth in new foreign markets, as
we discuss later. Moreover, while in the basic model we assume that export profitability is perfectly
correlated across markets and time, that assumption is clearly too strong. In particular, export
profitability that is imperfectly correlated across markets implies strictly positive first-to-second
year export growth in every market the firm expands to and survives. Our testing hypothesis is,
instead, that firms learn more about their export profitabilities in their first markets, so the early
expansion of surviving firms is greater in their initial markets than in their subsequent markets.
Our second prediction relates to entry patterns. Once a firm starts exporting, it will uncover
its export profitability. If it turns out to be suﬃciently high, the firm expands in the next period
to other markets where the firm anticipates positive profits.
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Prediction 2 (Entry) Conditional on survival, new exporters are more likely to enter other for-
eign markets than experienced ones.
Proof. Denote the probability that a firm that has just started to export will enter a new foreign
market j in the next period by Pr(ej2 = 1|eA1 = 1 & ej1 = 0), and the probability that a firm that has
been an exporter for a longer period will enter market j by Pr(ejt = 1|
Qt−1
i=1 e
A
t−i = 1 & e
j
t−1 = 0),
t ≥ 2. The model implies that Pr(eB2 = 1|eA1 = 1 & ej1 = 0) = 1 − G(2F 1/2 + τ j) > 0 = Pr(ejt =
1|Qt−1i=1 eAt−i = 1 & ejt−1 = 0), concluding the proof.
Experienced exporters have already learnt enough about their export profitability, and therefore
have already made their entry decisions in the past. In contrast, new exporters are learning now how
profitable they can be as exporters, and some will realize it pays to expand to other destinations.
Again, the message from our basic model is extreme, as it abstracts from all other motives for
expansion to diﬀerent foreign markets–which we seek to control for in our empirical analysis. But
it helps to highlight our central point, that (surviving) new exporters have an extra motivation for
expansion.
Our last prediction refers to the exit patterns of exporting firms.
Prediction 3 (Exit) A firm is more likely to exit a foreign market if it is a new exporter.
Proof. Let the probability of exiting a foreign market right after entering there be Pr(eA2 = 0|eA1 =
1) if the foreign market is the firm’s first, and Pr(ejt+1 = 0|ejt = 1 & ejt−1 = 1), t ≥ 2, j 6= A,
otherwise. The latter is also equal to the probability of exiting a market after being there for more
than one period. The model implies that
Pr(eA2 = 0|eA1 = 1) = G(τA) > 0 = Pr(ejt+1 = 0|ejt = 1 & ejt−1 = 1),
completing the proof.
An experienced exporter is better informed about export profitability in a new foreign destina-
tion than it would have been, were that foreign market the firm’s first. Accordingly, finding out
that it is not worthwhile to keep serving that market is more likely in the latter than in the former
case. While many reasons can cause a firm to abandon a foreign destination, we argue that being
a new exporter creates an additional motivation to do so, in expected terms.
3 Evidence
We can now test the main predictions of our model. We start by describing the data.
3.1 Data
Our data comes from the Argentine Customs Oﬃce. We observe the annual value (in US dollars) of
the foreign sales of each Argentine manufacturing exporter between 2002 and 2007, distinguished by
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country of destination. Over our sample period, Argentine manufacturing exports involved 15,301
exporters and 130 foreign destinations.
Appendix C presents the trends of aggregate exports in Argentina during 2002-2007, as well as
annual exports by sector and by destination. Figure 4 shows that Argentina experienced high export
growth during this period, to a large extent a consequence of the steep depreciation of its currency
in early 2002. As of 2007, Argentina’s main export manufacturing sectors (Table 9) are petroleum
(30%); food, tobacco and beverages (23%); and automotive and transport equipment (13%), while
Argentina’s main export destinations (Table 10) are its Mercosur partners Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay (35%), followed by North America (13%) and by Argentina’s other neighbors Chile and
Bolivia (10%).
All new exporters in our data set are "sequential exporters," in the sense that none of them
enter all 130 destinations at once. In fact, 79% of new exporters start in a single market, 15% enter
initially in two or three destinations, and just 6% start with more than three destinations. On
average, exporting firms serve three distinct foreign markets; around 40% of the exporting firms
serve only one destination.
Table 1 reveals some interesting features of diﬀerent types of exporters. First, new exporters–
which correspond to the sum of "entrants" (firms that not do not export in t − 1 but do so in
both t and t+ 1) and "single-year" exporters (i.e. firms that export in t but not in either t− 1 or
t+1)–are common in our sample, representing on average 24% of all exporters in a year. Second,
many new exporters are single-year (38% on average) and their share rises over time, reaching 47%
of all new exporters in 2006. Third, "continuers" (those that export in t− 1, t and t+ 1) account
for the bulk of exports in Argentina, while entrants and "exiters" (firms that export in t − 1 and
in t but not in t+ 1) are much smaller, and single-year exporters even more so.12
New exporters that remain active, on the other hand, grow fast. This can be observed in
Table 2, where we report the foreign sales of firms that break into a new market in 2003 and keep
exporting there in the subsequent years of our data set.13 We distinguish those exporting in 2003
for the first time ("First Market 2003") from those already in the exporting business ("New Market
2003"). To keep the comparison focused, we also look at the sales of the firms from the first group
that expand to other markets in 2004 ("Second Market 2004"). The table displays each group’s
average export value by year. Observe that the average firm from all groups increases exports in
every period but especially from its first to its second year in a market. Yet the feature of the
table that really stands out is the markedly higher initial growth of the new exporters in their first
market (190%), relative both to the initial growth of experienced exporters entering new markets
(108%) and to the initial growth of the same firms but in the markets they enter later (104%).
These regularities are unlikely to be specific to Argentina. In fact, many of them echo those
12Single-year exporters sell on average less than 20% of what other new exporters sell abroad in their first year.
In terms of our model, this suggests that the share of “pure experimenters” (i.e. those that start exporting even
though Eμ ≤ τA) is higher among the single-year exporters than among the other entrants. Naturally, the pure
experimenters are indeed the least likely to succeed as exporters.
13We focus on 2003 to obtain the longest possible time span after entry.
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Table 1: Exports by Type of Exporter
Number of firms
Year Total Entrant Exiter Continuer Single-Year
2002 7205
2003 8251 1484 499 5520 748
2004 9055 1569 487 6517 482
2005 10884 1568 1053 7033 1230
2006 10944 1244 1230 7371 1099
2007 10062
Total Value of exports (US$ Millions)
Year Total Entrant Exiter Continuer Single-Year
2002 17890
2003 18554 80 299 18183 26
2004 23544 133 34 23369 16
2005 29060 204 161 28603 102
2006 30872 362 127 30405 41
2007 41395
Exports per firm (US$ Thousands)
Year Total Entrant Exiter Continuer Single-Year
2002 2483
2003 2249 54 598 3294 34
2004 2600 85 70 3586 32
2005 2670 130 153 4067 83
2006 2821 291 103 4125 37
2007 4114
Note: "Entrants" in year t are firms that not did not export in t− 1, exported in t, and will export in t+ 1 as well.
"Exiters" exported in t− 1 and in t, but are not exporters in t+ 1. "Continuers" export in t− 1, t and t+ 1.
"Single-Year" exporters are firms that exported in t but neither in t− 1 nor in t+ 1.
Table 2: Firm-level export growth, First Market versus New Market
Year First Market 2003 Second Market 2004 New Market 2003
USD Growth (%) USD Growth (%) USD Growth (%)
2003 35465 96541
2004 102718 190 33831 200799 108
2005 139439 36 69100 104 304295 52
2006 163864 18 87036 26 340015 12
2007 216865 32 95835 10 449147 32
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observed by other authors in diﬀerent countries (e.g. Eaton et al. 2008 in Colombia, Buono et al.
2008 in France, Lawless 2009a in Ireland), although other authors do not distinguish between the
behavior of exporters in their first and their subsequent foreign markets. These regularities provide
a good illustration of our discussion in the Introduction. New exporters are small in foreign markets
relative to old exporters, and almost 40% of them drop out of foreign markets in less than a year.
Given the need to incur sunk costs to start exporting, those going through such short export spells
ought to be realizing substantially negative profits from their export experience. Hence they must
have expected very high profits in case of success abroad. Indeed, the new exporters that survive
expand fast, often at both the intensive and the extensive margins.
Naturally, while these regularities are all consistent with export profitability being positively
correlated over time and across destinations, other factors may also play a role in shaping these
aggregate figures. We therefore turn now to investigating our predictions in more detail.
3.2 Empirical results
3.2.1 Intensive margin
Our model predicts that, conditional on survival, the growth of a firm’s exports is on average highest
between the first and second periods in the first foreign market served by the firm (Prediction 1).
We test this prediction by estimating the following equation:
∆ logXijt = α1 (FYij,t−1 × FMij) + α2FMij + α3FYij,t−1 + {FE}+ uijt,
where ∆ logXijt is the growth rate of the value of exports between t and t− 1 by firm i in market
j, FYij,t−1 is a dummy indicating whether firm i exported to destination j in t − 1 for the first
time, and FMij indicates whether j is the firm’s first export market. Prediction 1 indicates that
α1 > 0, but we also include FY and FM by themselves because there could be other reasons that
make growth distinct in the first export market of a firm or in the firm’s first periods of activity in
a foreign market.
Of course, a number of other factors aﬀect a firm’s export growth in a market as well, such as the
general characteristics of the destination country, the economic conditions in the year, and the firm’s
own distinguishing characteristics. To account for those factors, we take advantage of the richness
of our data set and include a wide range of fixed eﬀects, {FE}, including year, destination–or
alternatively, year-destination–and firm fixed eﬀects. Firm fixed eﬀects control for all systematic
diﬀerences across firms that do not change over time, including diﬀerences in the level of firms’
productivities. Year-destination fixed eﬀects control for all aggregate shocks that aﬀect the general
attractiveness of a market–aggregate demand growth, exchange rate variations, political changes
etc. In these and all subsequent regressions, our standard errors allow for clusters in firms.
Importantly, the sample used in the intensive margin regressions consists of firms that exported
for at least two consecutive years to a destination–i.e. firms that survive more than a year in
a foreign market. Thus, selection is not an issue here. Notice also that, while the prediction is
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stated in terms of export quantities, the data report export values. Nonetheless, Prediction 1 can
be equivalently stated in terms of sales values as long as demand (d) and supply shocks (c) are
independently distributed (see Lemma 3 in Appendix A for the proof).
Table 3 displays the results. They show that growth is not in general higher in firms’ first
market, but it is so in their early periods of activity in a market. This could reflect market-specific
uncertainty (as in Eaton et al. 2009 and Freund and Pierola 2009), or perhaps the dynamics of
trust in business relationships.14 It reflects also a simple accounting phenomenon: since firms enter
markets over the year, initial exports appear artificially low in the first year whenever the data are
on an annual basis, as here.
Table 3: Intensive Margin Growth (Dependent Variable: ∆ logXijt)
OLS 1 2 3 4 5
FYij,t−1 × FMij -.032 .141** .098** .095** .308**
(.028) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.029)
FMij .025 -.013 -.009 -.008 -.043
(.018) (.038) (.039) (.038) (.035)
FYij,t−1 .263** .238** .233** .233** -.137**
(.014) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.014)
logXij,t−1 -.427**
(.007)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes
Destination FE yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes
Number of obs 107390 107390 107390 107390 107390
R-squared .01 .09 .10 .10 .30
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
The distinguishing feature of our proposed mechanism with respect to the intensive margin
regards, however, the interaction term: firms’ export growth should be higher in their early periods
of activity in their first export market. That is, we compare firms’ early growth in their first market
relative to their early growth in subsequent markets. We find that, indeed, the coeﬃcient associated
with FYij,t−1 × FMij is positive and significant in all specifications that include firm fixed eﬀects.
The insignificant coeﬃcient in the regression without firm fixed eﬀects simply reveals the degree
of firm heterogeneity in our sample. It indicates that firms that have high initial growth tend to
enter more markets, washing out the diﬀerential first-market eﬀect in the sample when the firms’
average export growth is not accounted for.
The eﬀect of being a new exporter on intensive-margin growth is economically sizeable, too.
Unconditional intensive-margin growth in our sample is 20%. However, average growth is about 23
percentage points higher in a firm’s initial period of activity in a market, and this eﬀect jumps to
14Rauch and Watson (2003) argue that exporters “start small” and are only able to expand once their foreign
partners are convinced of their reliability. Araujo and Ornelas (2007) point out that evolving trust levels within
partnerships substitute for weak cross-border contract enforcement, implying that trade volumes increase over time,
conditional on survival.
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33 percentage points if the market is the firm’s first.
A common view in the literature is that firms start exporting after experiencing positive persis-
tent idiosyncratic productivity shocks (e.g. Arkolakis 2009, Irrarazabal and Opromolla 2008). Due
to serial correlation, growth in exports fades over time as shocks die out. This could explain why
early export growth is highest in the first market. A way to partially control for this eﬀect is to
include the firm’s lagged export level. Column 5 of Table 3 shows that, when doing so, the eﬀect of
FYij,t−1 ×FMij on export growth remains positive and significant. In fact, the coeﬃcient is much
higher in that case.15
3.2.2 Entry
Our model predicts also that new exporters are more likely to enter new foreign destinations
(Prediction 2). To test this prediction, we create for every firm i exporting to some destination s
other than r at period t− 1, a binary variable Entryirt that takes the value of one if firm i enters
destination r at time t, and zero otherwise. Therefore non-entry corresponds to the choice by an
exporting firm i to not enter destination r at time t, although it might do so in the future. The
sample consists of all firms that export for at least 2 years.
For computational reasons, we must place a limit on the number of destinations.16 We define
nine regions (r) grouping diﬀerent countries: Mercosur, Chile-Bolivia (Argentina’s neighbors that
are not full Mercosur members), Other South America, Central America-Mexico, North America,
Spain-Italy (Argentina’s main historical migration sources), EU-27 except Spain-Italy, China, and
Rest of the World. Each of these geographic areas is relatively homogenous and account for a
sizeable share of Argentine exports (see Table 10 in Appendix C).17 The region that is responsible
for the smallest share is Spain-Italy, receiving 2% of Argentina’s exports in 2007. However, it
attracts 5% of all Argentine exporters, and 8% of all new exporters. Table 11 in Appendix C
shows, for each of our nine regions, their 2003 and 2007 shares of Argentine exporters, in general and
among new exporters. If the latter is larger than the former, it suggests the region is attractive as
a “testing ground.” The table shows that this is the case for Spain-Italy, Mercosur, North America,
Chile-Bolivia and, recently, China. Notice that our grouping of countries in regions implies that
when a firm enters a new country in a region r where it already exports, this is not coded as entry.18
We thus run the following regression on the probability of starting to export to a new market:
Pr[Entryirt = 1] = β1FYi,t−1 + {FE}+ virt,
where FYi,t−1 indicates whether the firm’s export experience started at t−1 (i.e., whether t is firm
15Notice also that, once we include firms’ lagged exports in the regression, the coeﬃcient of FYij,t−1 turns to
negative, indicating that an old exporter in a new market does not grow faster than an old exporter already in that
market. Without the control the opposite appears to be true, but it reflects instead the facts that firms start small
in new markets and that small exporters grow faster than large exporters.
16Notice that for this regression the observational unit is firm-year-destination without prior entry, and the average
of this last dimension by exporting firm in our sample is 127 (= 130− 3).
17We experienced with alternative groupings of destinations; they yield qualitatively similar results.
18Considering entry/non-entry within the region does not make an important diﬀerence to the results.
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i’s second year as an exporter). We include a wide range of fixed eﬀects here as well. Prediction
2 indicates that β1 > 0: fledgling exporters should be more likely to enter new destinations than
experienced exporters.
Results are presented in columns 1-4 of Table 4. FYi,t−1 has a positive and highly significant
coeﬃcient in all four specifications. The magnitudes may look small at first, but recall that they
reflect entry in a given region in a given year, so the entry we consider is a rather specific event.
We find that the probability of entering an "average" destination in an "average" year is around
one percentage point higher if the firm is a new exporter. This compares with an overall average
probability of 7% of entering a new foreign region.
Table 4: Probability of Exporting to a New Market
Dependent Variable: Entryirt Entryirt Entryirt Entryirt Entryirt D(ND)it D(ND)it
LPM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FYi,t−1 .008** .015** .009** .009** .006** .033** .048**
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.010)
∆logXi,−r,t .006** .052**
(.001) (.003)
∆logXi,−r,t × FYi,t−1 -.005** -.043**
(.002) (.008)
Tests:
FYi,t−1 + (∆logXi,−r,t × FYi,t−1)× .10 = 0 5.25
[.002]
FYi,t−1 + (∆logXi,−r,t × FYi,t−1)× .08 = 0 19.80
[.0001]
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Destination FE yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes
Number of obs 235693 235693 235693 235693 220335 32135 29760
R-squared .0002 .08 .09 .09 .10 .32 .32
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms. P-values in square brackets.
While we control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by using firm fixed eﬀects, those
regressions do not rule out the possibility that positive idiosyncratic productivity shocks are the
factors actually leading firms to expand in their early years as exporters. But since such shocks
would induce expansion at both intensive and extensive margins, we can control for them by
introducing intensive margin export growth (in the current destinations) by itself and interacted
with our indicator for new exporters, FYi,t−1:
Pr[Entryirt = 1] = β1FYi,t−1 + β2∆logXi,−r,t + β3 [∆logXi,−r,t × FYi,t−1] + {FE}+ ηirt.
The results are displayed in column 5 of Table 4. The coeﬃcient of FYi,t−1 remains positive
and significant. But we want to check whether being a new exporter matters also among the firms
24
expanding at the intensive margin. The relevant comparison is between new and old exporters
growing at the same rate g. A fledgling exporter growing at rate g is more likely to enter a new
destination than an experienced exporter growing at same rate if β1 + β3g > 0. At the point
estimates, this condition is equivalent to g < 1.2. Close to 97% of the observations satisfy this
condition. At the sample median, g = .10, this sum is positive and highly statistically significant,
as the F-test shows.
In columns 6 and 7, we run a diﬀerent regression, where we simply look at whether a surviving
exporter increased its number of foreign destinations (in which case D(ND)it = 1). This regression
has the disadvantage of treating all destinations equally, so for example both entry in a very large
market and entry in a very small market imply D(ND)it = 1. On the other hand, it makes possible
to consider entry in each of the 130 markets in the sample. We find that new exporters are 3.3
percentage points more likely to expand the number of markets they serve than experienced ones.
This is slightly more than a seventh of the overall (unconstrained) probability that a surviving
exporter will expand the number of destinations it serves, 22%. When we include intensive-margin
growth in the regression (column 7), the point estimates indicate that a new exporter growing at
rate g is more likely to add a new destination than an experienced exporter growing at the same
rate if g < 1.12. At the sample median of g = .08, the F-test shows that this condition is clearly
satisfied.
3.2.3 Exit
We turn now to the exit patterns of Argentina’s exporting firms. Our model predicts that the
probability that firm i will exit a particular export market j in period t (Exitijt = 1) is higher if
the firm exported for the first time in t− 1 (Prediction 3). To test this, we estimate the following
equation:
Pr[Exitijt = 1] = γ1(FYij,t−1 × FMij) + γ2FMij + γ3FYij,t−1 + {FE}+ ζijt.
The sample consists of all exporting firms. Again, we introduce fixed eﬀects to account for
country and year specific factors that aﬀect exit. Firm fixed eﬀects, on the other hand, are not
appropriate for the exit regressions, since Prediction 3 is about the behavior of single-year exporters.
As most single-year exporters represent only one observation in our data set, they are excluded
when we focus on within-firm variation. The only cases of single-year exporters that remain after
controlling for firm fixed eﬀects are re-entrant single-year exporters (firms that exported prior but
not at t− 2, and exited after exporting again at t− 1) or simultaneous single-year exporters (those
that broke simultaneously into more than one market in t− 1 and exited in t). Since simultaneous
exporters are relatively more confident about their export success at time of entry (recall that
simultaneous entry requires Eμ to be greater than τB and large relative to F ), they are less likely
to exit right after entry than pure sequential exporters. A related rationale applies for re-entrants.19
19 In the next subsection we study more closely both simultaneous exporters and re-entrants.
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Thus, we expect γ1 to be positive in all specifications that do not include firm fixed eﬀects. In
that case, we include sector fixed eﬀects to control, to the extent that is possible, for unobserved
heterogeneity. When firm fixed eﬀects are included, our model is silent about the sign of γ1.
Table 5 shows the results. Observe first that, in all estimations without firm fixed eﬀects
(columns 1-4 and 7), the coeﬃcients associated with FYij,t−1 and FMij are positive and significant,
indicating that in general exit from a market is more likely in a firm’s first market and in its early
periods of operation in a market. More importantly, the coeﬃcient of the interaction FYij,t−1×FMij
is also positive and significant in those regressions, confirming that exit rates from a market are
highest for fledgling exporters. Magnitudes are also economically significant. Being a fledgling
exporter increases the probability of exiting a market by almost 29 percentage points relative to
an exporter with experience in a market other than its first, by 15 percentage points relative to an
experienced exporter operating in its first foreign market, and by over 26 percentage points relative
to an experienced exporter that has just entered an additional market. These figures compare with
an overall average probability of 7% of exiting a market in a certain year.
Table 5: Probability of Exit after Exporting to a New Market (Dependent Variable: Exitijt)
LPM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FYij,t−1 × FMij .122** .121** .123** .125** -.199** -.197** .133**
(.004) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.006)
FMij .154** .149** .139** .138** -.015** -.017** .129**
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.004)
FYij,t−1 .017** .015** .026** .025** -.011** -.013** .009**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
logXij,t−1 -.009**
(.0003)
Firm FE yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Destination FE yes
Year FE yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes yes
Number of obs 119610 119610 119610 119610 119610 119610 119610
R-squared .13 .14 .15 .15 .69 .70 .16
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
Now, once firm fixed eﬀects are introduced (columns 5 and 6), the sign of the interaction (and
of FYij,t−1) shifts to negative. This shows that the exit patterns of firms that re-start to export
or start exporting in more than one market simultaneously are indeed very diﬀerent from those of
the firms that start with a single market. Specifically, new simultaneous exporters and re-entrants
are, jointly, less likely to exit than continuing exporters.
Finally, in column 7 we control for firms’ lagged export levels (in addition to sector and year-
destination fixed eﬀects), since low sales in a year may suggest a low expectation of survival. This
is indeed what we find. There is however little change in the coeﬃcient of FYij,t−1 × FMij .
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3.3 Robustness
The key predictions from our model are strongly supported by the Argentine data, but they may be
driven by alternative explanations that are correlated with ours. We have discussed the possibility
that our regressions may be simply picking up behavior driven by idiosyncratic firm productivity
shocks. Our controls in the intensive margin and entry regressions suggest that this is not the
case. In particular, there is no reason for a productivity shock to cause additional growth in
the first export market on the first year. Moreover, the productivity shocks rationale is at odds
with our results on exit. As pointed out by Ruhl and Willis (2009), if productivity shocks alone
drove the behavior of exporting firms, the hazard rate out of exporting would have to increase
with export tenure as shocks die out over time. Our results on exit indicate that the opposite is
true,20 further confirming that there is more to the dynamics of new exporters than productivity
shocks.21 Similarly, a “learning-by-exporting” process by which an exporter’s productivity improves
with exposure to foreign competition would be consistent with high early intensive-margin growth,
provided that most learning takes place in the initial period of foreign activities. A learning-
by-exporting process is, however, diﬃcult to reconcile with our findings about high early exit.
Furthermore, the evidence on learning from exporting indicates that, if it exists, it is likely to be
specific to the destination market.22 Thus, such a mechanism would also be unable to rationalize our
findings that fledgling exporters are more likely to enter new markets than experienced exporters.
There are however other mechanisms that could be advanced and may be consistent with our
main results. Thus, we now run further tests to better distinguish our mechanism from others. We
start by looking at firms that re-enter foreign markets and of simultaneous exporters, which our
model suggests should behave diﬀerently from new sequential exporters.
3.3.1 Re-entrants
First, we focus on re-entrant exporters. These are the firms that did not export at t − 1 but did
so before t− 1 and export again at t. Of the 15,301 exporting firms in our sample, we can identify
17% as re-entrants. Observations associated with the activities of these re-entrants correspond to
6%, 3% and 2% of the observations in the samples used in the intensive margin, entry and exit
regressions, respectively. Since we cannot spot all re-entrants (i.e. some firms that we identify as
"true" new exporters may have exported before 2002, the fist year of our sample), in the main
regressions we treat all firms that export at t but not at t−1 as new exporters. However, according
20 In line with the findings of previous studies focusing on the hazard rates out of exporting, such as Besedes and
Prusa (2006).
21Binding capacity constraints may as well be consistent with early intensive- and extensive-margin growth, but
not with early exit. If a firm faced binding capacity constraints as it entered foreign markets, but capacity could
be expanded disproportionately within a year, intensive-margin growth and the probability of expansion to other
markets would be disproportionately high in the second year. However, exit would be unaﬀected as the survival
cutoﬀ does not depend on (sunk) capacity-building costs. The idea of capacity constraints forcing firms to enter
foreign markets "small" also conflicts with studies that show that firms often undertake significant investment before
entering foreign markets, as a preparation for exporting (e.g. Iacovone and Javorcik 2009).
22See the survey by Wagner (2007).
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to our model (barring problems with "short memory"), if firm i had exported prior to t− 1, when
re-starting to export in period t the firm should already have a reliable (in the strictest version of
the model, a perfect) signal of its export profitability, so the change in the value of its shipment to
a market between t and t+1 should not be as large as it would be for a first-time exporter. By the
same token, re-entrants in t should be less likely to exit and to expand to new destinations at t+1
than first-time exporters. Thus, if our model is right, the inclusion of re-entrants as new exporters
should only weaken our results.
But we can also test explicitly for diﬀerential eﬀects between "regular" new exporters and re-
entrants, which no alternative theories that we are aware of would predict. To do so, we re-run our
three main regressions (intensive margin, entry and exit) with our key variables by themselves and
interacted with an indicator of whether the firm is a re-entrant (REi), plus the indicator by itself.
We add year-destination fixed eﬀects in all regressions, sector fixed eﬀects in the exit regression,
and firm fixed eﬀects in the intensive margin and entry regressions. We run the intensive margin
and exit regressions with and without lagged export levels.
Table 6 displays the results. They lend broad support to our theory. Notice first that our main
coeﬃcients in each regression remain positive and statistically significant, and in fact are generally
higher than the estimates that do not distinguish re-entrants. Moreover, their interactions with
REi yield estimates that are either statistically indistinguishable from zero or, as in most cases,
negative and significant.
More specifically, consider the firms that are in their first market (FMij = 1). We can ask
whether the extra eﬀect from being in their first year of activity there (in the current spell) is
diﬀerent for re-entrants. The diﬀerential eﬀect is given by the sum of the coeﬃcients on FY ×
FM × RE and FY × RE. As the F-tests show, this sum is negative and statistically significant
for both exit specifications and for the intensive margin specification that does not include lagged
exports (when lagged exports are included, the sum is statistically indistinguishable from zero).
These results indicate that, for firms in their first market, the extra eﬀect from being a new exporter
on intensive-margin growth and on the likelihood of exit is lower if the firm is a re-entrant. The
F-tests on the sum of the coeﬃcients on (FY × FM × RE) + (FY × FM) + (FY + RE) + FY
indicate that the overall extra eﬀect from being a new exporter for re-entrants in their first market
is still positive for intensive-margin growth; however, it is actually negative for the probability of
exit.
Similarly, consider the firms that are starting to export to a market (FYij,t−1 = 1). We can test
whether the extra eﬀect due to being in their first market is diﬀerent for re-entrants. The results
indicate that the impact of the first market on intensive-margin growth and on the probability of
exit is generally weaker for re-entrants. Indeed, the results are very similar to the results on the
impact of the first year discussed above, as shown by the F-tests on the sum of the coeﬃcients on
(FY × FM ×RE) + (FM ×RE) and on (FY × FM ×RE) + (FM ×RE) + FM + (FM ×RE).
Finally, we can ask whether the pattern of entry in diﬀerent regions is the same for first-time
exporters and for those re-entering export activities. The results indicate that the latter are indeed
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Table 6: Diﬀerential Eﬀects: Re-entrant Exporters (RE)
∆ logXijt ∆ logXijt Entryirt Exitijt Exitijt
FYij,t−1 × FMij .161** .294** .158** .164**
(.040) (.033) (.006) (.006)
FMij -.049 -.047 .093** .086**
(.039) (.037) (.004) (.004)
FYij,t−1 .257** -.119** .012** -.002
(.018) (.016) (.001) (.001)
FYij,t−1 × FMij ×REit -.178* .079 -.364** -.363**
(.081) (.064) (.014) (.014)
FMij ×REit -.089 -.109 -.049** -.047**
(.131) (.112) (.013) (.013)
FYij,t−1 ×REit -.098** -.072** .087** .089**
(.032) (.028) (.014) (.014)
REit .546* .331† .320** .314**
(.241) (.204) (.014) (.014)
logXij,t−1 -.428** -.008**
(.007) (.0003)
FYi,t−1 .009**
(.002)
FYi,t−1 ×REit -.005
(.011)
REit .023
(.020)
Tests:
(FYij,t−1 × FMij ×REit) + (FYij,t−1 ×REit) = 0 3.91 0.01 352.08 345.88
[.048] [.917] [.0001] [.0001]
(FYij,t−1 × FMij ×REit) + (FMij ×REit) = 0 11.69 0.07
[.001] [.793]
(FYij,t−1 × FMij) + (FYij,t−1 × FMij ×REit)+
FYij,t−1 + (FYij,t−1 ×REit) = 0 3.88 4.49 60.01 64.53
[.049] [.034] [.0001] [.0001]
(FYij,t−1 × FMij) + (FYij,t−1 × FMij ×REit)+
FMij + (FMij ×REit) = 0 1.63 10.65 157.24 153.77
[.202] [.001] [.0001] [.0001]
FYi,t−1 + (FYi,t−1 ×REit) +REit 2.65
[.103]
Firm FE yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes yes yes yes
Number of obs 107390 107390 235693 119610 119610
R-squared .10 .30 .09 .23 .24
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%; †: significant at 10%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms. P-values in square brackets.
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less likely to expand to new regions. In fact, the sum of the coeﬃcients on FY +(FY ×RE)+RE
indicates that the entry pattern of those returning to foreign markets is hardly diﬀerent from the
pattern of continuing exporters.
Overall, then, we find that re-entrants are less likely to grow in their first market and to exit right
after re-entering their first market than ordinary entrants. Moreover, they are less likely to expand
to diﬀerent regions after re-starting foreign sales than first-time exporters.23 One interpretation is
that re-entrants are firms that respond to customers’ orders but do not establish permanent export
presence in foreign markets, perhaps because of the type of product they produce or industry they
operate in, perhaps because their uncovered μ is not large enough to justify paying the sunk costs
necessary to have a permanent foreign presence. What is most important for us, however, is that
the behavior of the re-entrants is not nearly as aﬀected by their initial experience abroad after
re-entry as the ‘regular’ new exporters are.
3.3.2 Simultaneous exporters
Second, we investigate whether the behavior of simultaneous exporters–i.e., the firms that start
exporting to more than one destination (which we code as SIMi = 1)–is distinct from the behavior
of the pure sequential exporters. Our model indicates that simultaneous exporters are willing
to pay the sunk costs to enter multiple markets because they are optimistic about their export
profitability (i.e. because Eμ is high relative to τB and large relative to F ). This implies diﬀerent
behavior relative to the firms that break in a single foreign destination, suggesting less volatility
in all dimensions for these firms. To test for such diﬀerences, we re-run our three main regressions
adding interactions between our key variables and the indicator SIMi.24 As before, we add year-
destination fixed eﬀects in all regressions, sector fixed eﬀects in the exit regression, and firm fixed
eﬀects in the intensive margin and entry regressions. We also run the intensive margin and exit
regressions with and without lagged export levels.
Table 7 shows the results. In all specifications, our main coeﬃcients remain positive and sta-
tistically significant, and are generally higher than in the baseline regressions. Furthermore, their
interactions with SIMi generate estimates that are either statistically indistinguishable from zero
or, as in most cases, negative and significant.
Considering in particular the firms that are in their first market (FMij = 1), we can ask whether
the extra eﬀect from being in their first year of activity there is diﬀerent for the simultaneous
entrants. The diﬀerential eﬀect is given by the sum of the coeﬃcients on FY × FM × SIM and
FY × SIM . As the F-tests show, this sum is indistinguishable from zero in the intensive margin
regressions. However, it is clearly negative in the exit regressions, indicating that simultaneous
exporters are indeed less likely to exit one of their first markets than pure sequential exporters. We
can similarly test, for firms starting to export to a market (FYij,t−1 = 1), whether the extra eﬀect
23 If we re-run the regressions in Table 6 restricting the sample to 2005 onwards (so we minimize the possibility of
coding a re-entrant as a new exporter while still allowing for firm fixed eﬀects), results remain qualitatively unaltered.
24Notice that, whenever we use firm fixed eﬀects, the variable SIMi is dropped from the regression.
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Table 7: Diﬀerential Eﬀects: Simultaneous Exporters (SIM)
∆ logXijt ∆ logXijt Entryirt Exitijt Exitijt
FYij,t−1 × FMij .105* .305** .243** .250**
(.046) (.036) (.007) (.007)
FMij .009 -.060 .140** .132**
(.051) (.048) (.005) (.005)
FYij,t−1 .235** -.145** .023** .007**
(.016) (.015) (.001) (.001)
FYij,t−1 × FMij × SIMi .004 -.159* -.063** -.050*
(.095) (.077) (.015) (.023)
FMij × SIMi -.043 .114 -.291** -.301**
(.083) (.075) (.020) (.027)
FYij,t−1 × SIMi -.023 .188** -.196** -.205*
(.073) (.059) (.017) (.024)
SIMi .285** .292**
(.024) (.029)
logXij,t−1 -.428** -.009**
(.007) (.0003)
FYi,t−1 .011**
(.002)
FYi,t−1 × SIMi -.007†
(.004)
Tests:
(FYij,t−1 × FMij × SIMi) + (FYij,t−1 × SIMi) = 0 0.09 0.32
[.768] [.570]
(FYij,t−1 × FMij × SIMi) + (FMij × SIMi) = 0 0.21 0.35
[.650] [.555]
(FYij,t−1 × FMij) + (FYij,t−1 × FMij × SIMi)+
FYij,t−1 + (FYij,t−1 × SIMi) = 0 43.57 23.48 2.98 3.42
[.0001] [.0001] [.084] [0.06]
(FYij,t−1 × FMij) + (FYij,t−1 × FMij × SIMi)+
FMij + (FMij × SIMi) = 0 1.28 12.36 0.25 0.01
[.259] [.0004] [.620] [.903]
FYi,t−1 + (FYi,t−1 × SIMi) + SIMi 0.62
[.430]
Firm FE yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes yes yes yes
Number of obs 107390 107390 235693 119610 119610
R-squared .10 .30 .09 .18 .19
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%; †: significant at 10%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms. P-values in square brackets.
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due to being in their first market is diﬀerent for simultaneous exporters. Again, with respect to
intensive-margin growth, we cannot distinguish the extra eﬀect from being in one’s first market for
simultaneous versus pure sequential exporters. On the other hand, there is a very clear diﬀerential
eﬀect for the probability of exit. In fact, new simultaneous exporters are as likely to exit one of
their first markets as old exporters are to exit their subsequent markets upon entry there, as the
F-tests on the sum of the coeﬃcients on (FY ×FM×SIM)+(FM×SIM)+FM+(FM×SIM)
indicate.
Finally, the entry regression shows that new simultaneous exporters are less likely to expand to
new regions than new (pure) sequential exporters. Indeed, the F-test on FY +(FY ×SIM) shows
that they are no more likely to expand to new regions than old exporters.
We therefore conclude that, upon entry, simultaneous exporters do behave similarly to pure
sequential exporters in terms of their intensive-margin growth, conditional on survival. On the other
hand, new simultaneous exporters are much less likely to exit and to expand to other destinations
than other new exporters (in fact behaving very similarly to old exporters in those dimensions), in
line with the predictions of our model.
3.3.3 Other robustness checks
Third, our findings on entry are consistent with within-industry learning, as in Hausmann and
Rodrik (2003), Alvarez et al. (2007), Krautheim (2008) and Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008).
That is, firms may use the entry of domestic rivals in foreign markets as a signal of their own
odds of success as exporters.25 To consider this possibility, we estimate the following expanded
specification (with firm and year-destination fixed eﬀects) of our entry regression:
Pr[Entryijt = 1] = β1FYi,t−1 + β2NArgExpkr,t−1 + β3∆logX(ArgExpkrt) + ξijt,
where NArgExpkr,t−1 is the number of Argentine exporters (measured in thousands) in industry
k selling to region r at t − 1 and ∆logX(ArgExpkrt) is the export growth to r of these same
competitors between t and t − 1. These variables control, respectively, for static and dynamic
characteristics of export profitability that a firm may infer from observing its rivals.
The first two columns of Table 8 display the results controlling for within-industry learning.
Consistently with within-industry learning eﬀects, the number and the growth rates of domestic
competitors in a given destination help to explain entry there. Nevertheless, a new exporter remains
significantly more likely to enter a new destination than an experienced exporter. Thus, our finding
of the role of experimentation in fostering entry in new destinations is not a mere artifact of domestic
rivals’ informational externality.
Some of our results may also be driven by the presence of credit constraints. For example,
if firms face liquidity constraints at entry, then the inability of either financing sunk entry costs
25The idea of learning from the experience of others in foreign markets extends also to the product extensive margin
(Iacovone and Javorcik 2010), as well as to decisions beyond exporting, such as foreign direct investments (Lin and
Saggi 1999).
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Table 8: Controlling for Within-Industry Learning and Credit Constraints
Entryirt Entryirt ∆ logXijt Entryirt Exitijt
Controlling for Within-Industry Learning
FYi,t−1 .009** .009**
(.002) (.002)
NArgExpkr,t−1 .092** .095**
(.009) (.009)
∆logXArgExpkrt .004**
(.001)
Excluding Credit-Constrained Sectors
FYij,t−1 × FMij .165** .123**
(.057) (.008)
FMij -.034 .133**
(.06) (.006)
FYij,t−1 .242** .021**
(.025) (.002)
FYi,t−1 .009**
(.004)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes yes yes yes
Number of obs 235693 227769 43258 87892 71349
R-squared .09 .10 .10 .09 .15
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
internally or of obtaining the necessary external credit could force some firms to enter foreign
markets sequentially when they would prefer to enter them simultaneously. Similarly, as more
experienced exporters become less constrained due to retained earnings, credit constraints may
also help to explain the high intensive-margin growth of surviving new exporters. Employing a
panel of bilateral exports at the industry level, Manova (2008) finds that credit constraints are
indeed important determinants of export participation and of export volumes. Muuls (2009) finds
that credit constraints make Belgian exporters less likely to expand to other foreign destinations.
Since credit constraints may be correlated with being a new exporter, we need to check whether
they may be driving our results.
To account for the role of credit constraints in shaping exporting behavior, we would ideally
use credit constraint information at the firm level. Since that information is unavailable to us,
we borrow Manova’s (2008) measure of ‘asset tangibility’ to identify the industries that are least
credit constrained, i.e. those that have the highest proportion of collateralizable assets. We then
define an industry to be relatively credit unconstrained if the value of asset tangibility for the
industry is above the median for the whole manufacturing sector (i.e. 30%), and examine whether
our predictions hold for the subsample of credit unconstrained firms (we include firm fixed eﬀects
in the intensive margin and entry regressions, sector fixed eﬀects in the exit regressions, and year-
destination fixed eﬀects in all of them). The last three columns of Table 8 show the results. They
are very similar to our previous results, indicating that the eﬀects from experimentation that we
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uncover are not driven by firms being in sectors that are more likely to be liquidity constrained.
We have also carried out additional robustness checks, which are unreported to save space but
are available upon request. These are as follows. (i) We exclude exports of "samples," defined
as yearly transactions of less than $1000, to see whether our results are driven by very small
exporters.26 (ii) We consider the possibility of "slow learning," where FY is defined over two years,
to allow for a longer period of uncertainty resolution about one’s type. (iii) We employ diﬀerent
adjustments of robust standard errors, like clustering in destinations. None of the results from
those alternative specifications change our main messages in an important way.
4 Trade Liberalization and Policy Implications
Our empirical analysis strongly suggests that correlation of firms’ export profitabilities over time
and across destinations is an important ingredient of firms’ export decisions. Does that matter?
Should we care? We argue that we should. In addition to providing a new insight to help us
understand better how firms behave in foreign markets, the mechanism we propose renders the
impact of trade liberalization on trade flows subtler, more complex, and potentially much larger
than standard trade theories suggest. This opens new perspectives for trade policy, in particular
the coordination of trade policies across countries, as in regional and multilateral trade agreements.
To show this, we examine trade liberalization in a simple extension of the basic model that includes
many firms/sectors.
Consider a continuum of total mass one of firms with heterogeneous sunk costs of exporting,
F . Let F follow a continuous c.d.f. H(F ) on the support [0,∞). As before, for each firm ex ante
profitability follows G(μ). Let h(·) and g(·) denote the p.d.f.s of H(·) and G(·), respectively. We
assume that F and μ are independently distributed. Assuming independence is analytically very
convenient. It also clarifies that the third-country eﬀects of trade liberalization identified below do
not depend on assuming (perhaps more realistically) that more profitable firms (or sectors) have
higher fixed entry costs. The independence assumption implies an equivalence between having a
single firm (as in the basic model) and a continuum of monopolists.
The number of potential firms in Home is exogenous and normalized to one. The total number
of exporters to market j = A,B in period t = 1, 2, M jt , follows from Proposition 1:
• MA1 = H
£
FSq(τA, τB)
¤
firms export to market A at t = 1;
• MB1 = H
£
FSm(τB)
¤
of firms export to market B at t = 1;
• MA2 = H
£
FSq(τA, τB)
¤ £
1−G(τA)
¤
of firms export to market A at t = 2, all of which already
exported to A at t = 1;
• MB2 = H
£
FSm(τB)
¤ £
1−G(τB)
¤
+
R FSq
FSm
h
1−G(2F 12 + τB)
i
dH(F ) firms export to market
B at t = 2. The first term corresponds to existing exporters, the second to new entrants;
26We also try $2000 and $3000 as alternative thresholds.
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• 1−H £FSq(τA, τB)¤ firms do not export.
Quantities sold in markets j = A,B at t = 1 follow bqj1, as defined in expressions (6) and (7).
Quantities sold at t = 2 by new and old firms follow the expressions developed in subsection 2.2.1.
From an ex-ante perspective, the expected value of these quantities are given in Prediction 1.
Let us then start to look at the eﬀects of a t = 1 permanent decrease in trade cost τ j on export
levels. Consider first the intensive margin. Clearly, a fall in τA increases sales of current exporters
to A at t = 1 without aﬀecting sales to B, while a fall in τB has symmetric immediate eﬀects. At
t = 2, export levels rise for surviving exporters. This is counterbalanced by a negative composition
eﬀect: the new entrants benefiting from lower trade costs operate at a lower-than-average scale.
The overall intensive margin eﬀect is therefore generally ambiguous.27
The most interesting and novel features of the model regard however the extensive margin
eﬀects of trade liberalization. As a first step, we determine how variable trade costs aﬀect the entry
thresholds FSm(τB) and FSq(τA, τB).
Lemma 1 Variable trade costs in markets A and B aﬀect the sunk cost thresholds as follows:
• dFSmdτA = 0;
• dFSmdτB = −1{Eμ>τB}
?
Eμ−τB
2
?
+
? 2[FSm]1/2+τB
τB
?
μ−τB
2
?
dG(μ)
G(2[FSm]1/2+τB)
≤ 0;
• dFSqdτA = −
?
1{Eμ>τA}
?
Eμ−τA
2
?
+
? μ
τA
?
μ−τA
2
?
dG(μ)
?
2−G
?
2[FSq ]1/2+τB
? < 0;
• dFSqdτB = −
?
? μ
2[FSq ]1/2+τB
?
μ−τB
2
?
dG(μ)
?
2−G
?
2[FSq]1/2+τB
? < 0.
Proof. Condition (16) for eB1 = 1 defines F
Sm implicitly when it holds with equality: FSm =
1{Eμ>τB}
£
Ψ(τB)−W (τB;FSm)
¤
. It is straightforward to see that dF
Sm
dτA = 0. From Proposition
1, we know that FSm = 0 if Eμ ≤ τB, so in that case dFSmdτB = 0 too. If instead Eμ > τ
B, then
FSm > 0 and we can find dFSm/dτB by applying the implicit function theorem:
dFSm
dτB
= 1{Eμ>τB}
∙
∂Ψ(τB)/∂τB − ∂W (τB;FSm)/∂τB
1 + ∂W (τB;FSm)/∂F
¸
= −1{Eμ>τB}
⎡
⎢⎣
³
Eμ−τB
2
´
+
R 2[FSm]1/2+τB
τB
³
μ−τB
2
´
dG(μ)
G(2 [FSm]1/2 + τB)
⎤
⎥⎦ ≤ 0.
27Lawless (2009b) shows that both eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other in a heterogeneous firms’ model a la Melitz
(2003) whenever export sales follow a Pareto distribution. However, she finds ambiguous intensive margin eﬀects of
trade cost reductions in empirical work on U.S. firms’ exports.
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Condition (15) for eA1 = 1 defines F
Sq implicitly when it holds with equality: FSq = Ψ(τA) +
W (τB;FSq). Applying the implicit function theorem to this identity, we obtain
dFSq
dτA
=
∂Ψ(τA)/∂τA
1− ∂W (τB;FSq)/∂F = −
h
1{Eμ>τA}
³
Eμ−τA
2
´
+
R μ
τA
³
μ−τA
2
´
dG(μ)
i
2−G
³
2 [FSq]1/2 + τB
´ < 0, and
dFSq
dτB
=
∂W (τB;F )/∂τB
1− ∂W (τB;FSq)/∂F = −
hR μ
2[FSq ]1/2+τB
³
μ−τB
2
´
dG(μ)
i
2−G
³
2 [FSq]1/2 + τB
´ < 0,
completing the proof.
We can now establish the extensive margin eﬀects of trade liberalization in countries A and B
in both the short and the long runs.28
Proposition 3 Trade liberalization in a country has qualitatively diﬀerent eﬀects on entry in the
short and long runs, and encourages entry in other countries. Specifically:
a) A decrease in τA at t = 1, holding τB fixed:
1. increases the number of Home exporters to A at t = 1 and at t = 2;
2. has no eﬀect on Home exports to B at t = 1, but increases the number of Home exporters to
B at t = 2.
b) A decrease in τB at t = 1, holding τA fixed and such that τB remains larger than τA:
1. increases the number of Home exporters to A at t = 1 and t = 2;
2. increases the number of Home exporters to B at t = 1 and t = 2.
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of M jt , Lemma 1, and the facts that H(·) is a
non-decreasing function and that both 1 − G(τB + 2F
1
2 ) and 1 − G(τB) are decreasing in τB.
Diﬀerentiating the M jt ’s with respect to both variable trade costs, we obtain:
• dMA1dτj = h(FSq)dF
Sq
dτj < 0, j = A,B;
• dMB1dτA = h(FSm)dF
Sm
dτA = 0;
• dMA2dτA = h(FSq)dF
Sq
dτA
£
1−G(τA)
¤
−H(FSq)g(τA) < 0;
• dMB2dτA = h(FSq)dF
Sq
dτA
h
1−G(2
£
FSq
¤1/2
+ τB)
i
< 0;
• dMB1dτB = h(FSq)dF
Sm
dτB < 0;
28 It can be shown that reductions in trade costs have qualitatively similar eﬀects on aggregate trade flows in both
the short and long runs, despite the ambiguous intensive margin eﬀect in the long run.
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• dMA2dτB = h(FSq)dF
Sq
dτB
£
1−G(τA)
¤
< 0.
To find dM
B
2
dτB , notice that
dMB2
dτB
=h(FSm)
dFSm
dτB
£
1−G(τB)
¤
−H(FSm)g(τB)
+ h(FSq)
dFSq
dτB
h
1−G(2
£
FSq
¤1/2
+ τB)
i
−
Z FSq
FSm
g(2F
1
2 + τB)dH(F )
− h(FSm)dF
Sm
dτB
h
1−G(2
£
FSm
¤1/2
+ τB)
i
=h(FSq)
dFSq
dτB
h
1−G(2
£
FSq
¤1/2
+ τB)
i
−
Z FSq
FSm
g(2F
1
2 + τB)dH(F )+
+ h(FSm)
dFSm
dτB
h
G(2
£
FSm
¤1/2
+ τB)−G(τB)
i
−H(FSm)g(τB),
which is negative since each of its terms are negative.
Proposition 3 has three startling elements. First, it shows that trade liberalization has im-
mediate as well as delayed eﬀects on trade flows. This distinction is especially important given
economists’ typical focus on the static gains from trade; our analysis indicates that we should not
disregard lagged responses of trade flows to trade barriers. Second, the Proposition shows that
trade liberalization in a country aﬀects entry into other countries. Third, it shows that this in-
duced entry in other markets is always present in the long run, but not necessarily in the short
run.
To understand the eﬀects of trade liberalization more fully, consider first the short run. A lower
τA makes early entry in market A more appealing, as expected, but so does a lower τB, because it
increases the profits from potentially entering market B at t = 2. By contrast, while τB directly
aﬀects the decision to enter market B at t = 1, τA plays no direct role in that decision. The
reason is that the choice between entering markets sequentially or simultaneously is unaﬀected by
τA. Conversely, in the long run there is no asymmetry and cross-market eﬀects are always present.
As variable trade costs fall, firms’ potential future gains from learning their export profitabilities
increase. As a result, more firms choose to engage in exporting. Among those new exporters, a
fraction will find it profitable to enter other destinations in the future.
Hence, Proposition 3 implies that trade liberalization in a country creates trade externalities
to other countries. From the perspective of Argentine firms, for example, this means that events
such as the opening of the Chinese market since the late 1990s may have induced some firms to
start exporting to Argentina’s neighbors: even though trade policy in those countries have hardly
changed in the last ten years, the better prospect of serving the Chinese market increases the
attractiveness of experimenting as exporters, and nearby markets could serve that role. Similarly,
the formation of Mercosur in 1991 may have been responsible for the subsequent entry of some
Argentine firms in North American or European markets, as they realized their export potential
by serving the Mercosur partners.
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Taking into account the implications of our mechanism, the Mercosur example also highlights
the fact that the consequences of trade agreements could be very diﬀerent from what existing studies
suggest. Specifically, an RTA will tend to spawn an extensive margin trade creation eﬀect–and one
that involves third countries. That is, even from a purely partial equilibrium perspective, regional
integration can create trade with non-partner countries for reasons that are entirely diﬀerent from
those emphasized in the existing literature, and involving not greater imports, but enhanced exports
to non-members. Naturally, empirical research focused on this eﬀect is necessary to gather its
practical relevance.29
5 Conclusion
Firms typically start exporting small volumes to a single country. Despite the high entry sunk costs
these firms often have to incur, many drop out of the export business very shortly. By contrast, the
successful ones grow at both the intensive and the extensive margins. Most existing trade models,
including ‘new new trade theory’ ones based on selection due to heterogeneity in productivity and
export sunk costs, are not well equipped to address these dynamic patterns. In this paper, we
argue that firms’ uncertainty about their success in foreign markets is central to understanding
their export patterns, provided that this uncertainty is correlated over time and across markets.
We develop the minimal model to address the implications of this mechanism. A firm discovers
its profitability as an exporter only after exporting takes place. After learning it, the firm can condi-
tion the decision to serve other destinations on this information. Since breaking into new markets
entails significant and unrecoverable costs, the correlation of export profitability across markets
gives the firm an incentive to enter foreign destinations sequentially. For example, neighboring
markets could serve as natural “testing grounds” for future expansions to larger or distant markets.
We derive specific predictions from our model and test them using Argentine firm-level data. We
cannot reject any of the predictions. We are equally unable to come up with alternative mecha-
nisms that would lead to a similar set of predictions. This leads us to conclude that uncertainty
correlated over time and across markets is a central determinant of firms’ export strategies.
This mechanism has potentially broad implications. First, it implies a trade externality : ex-
ports to a country could increase because other countries have liberalized trade, thereby making
experimentation in foreign markets more profitable. Thus, our findings indicate that existing stud-
ies of major proposals for multilateral liberalization, like those discussed under the current Doha
29Our data set does not permit such an evaluation because Argentina has not formed any RTA after Mercosur.
However, the single empirical study of how an RTA aﬀects members’ exports to non-members that we are aware of, by
Borchert (2009), suggests that RTAs might indeed be very conducive of sequential exporting. Borchert finds that the
growth of Mexican exports to Latin America from 1993–right before NAFTA entered into force–to 1997 is higher,
the greater the reduction in the preferential U.S. tariﬀ under NAFTA for that product. Moreover, and critically, this
eﬀect comes entirely from changes in the extensive margin. While most existing trade models would find it diﬃcult
to explain this finding, it corresponds to a direct implication of our model. In the same spirit, the literature on the
euro’s trade eﬀect finds a positive eﬀect of the euro on the eurozone’s external trade, and in particular a one-sided
eﬀect on eurozone exports, not imports (see for example Micco et al. 2003 and Flam and Nordström 2007). Our
theory oﬀers one possible rationalization of this external and one-sided eﬀect of the euro.
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Round of negotiations in the World Trade Organization, could greatly understate their impact on
trade flows, since those studies do not account for the lagged and third-country eﬀects on firms’
export decisions that we uncover. The same is true for studies seeking to evaluate the eﬀective-
ness of the GATT/WTO system in promoting trade (e.g. Rose 2004). Similar implications apply
to the more limited–but much more widespread–arrangements of liberalization at the regional
level. Regional liberalization raises the number of firms willing to experiment with intra-regional
exports. Eventually, some of those firms choose to break into extra-regional markets as well. This
lagged trade-creation eﬀect toward non-members corresponds to an implication of regional trade
agreements that the literature has so far entirely neglected.
Our model is not designed for welfare analysis, and therefore we are not in a position to discuss
optimal trade policy. However, it seems clear that the trade externality we uncover can provide a
strong reason for broader coordination of trade policies across countries. That is, the sequentiality of
firms’ export strategies due to their profitabilities as exporters being uncertain, but correlated across
markets, could provide the basis for a new rationale for multilateral trade institutions such as the
WTO. Such a rationale would be independent of terms of trade eﬀects (Bagwell and Staiger 1999),
strategic uncertainty (Calvo-Pardo 2009), commitment motives (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 2007),
production relocation externalities (Ossa 2009), and profit-shifting motives (Mrazova 2009)–the
existing explanations for multilateral trade cooperation.
The resulting trade externality need not, however, warrant export promotion policies. One
may be led to think that, because entry in one foreign market can lead to future entry in other
destinations, governments may play a positive role in this process by enacting policies that induce
domestic firms to start exporting. This need not be the case, and could actually be misleading,
because individual firms take all the benefits related to their future export performance into account
when deciding whether to become an exporter. Naturally, if the government had access to a better
technology to acquire and disseminate information than those available to the private sector, then
there would be a role for export promotion policies. Similarly, if there were market ineﬃciencies–
e.g. credit constraints that prevent willing domestic firms from entering foreign markets–then
their interaction with our proposed mechanism could provide a role for public intervention. But
since such market ineﬃciencies alone may justify active trade policies at the national level even in
the absence of sequential exporting, it is not clear that the mechanism we develop here generates
new reasons for national export promotion policies. A thorough assessment of such issues would
nevertheless require a fully specified general equilibrium model. This is beyond the scope of this
paper, but future research building on our analysis could deliver important insights for the design
of national trade policy.
Sequential exporting strategies could also help to rationalize some empirical findings from the
trade literature, such as the apparent excess sensitivity of trade flows to changes in trade barriers
(Yi 2003), and the greater sensitivity of trade flows to trade costs at the extensive relative to
the intensive margin (Bernard et al. 2007, Mayer and Ottaviano 2007). However, for a thorough
evaluation of the implications of sequential exporting for these issues, a more general theoretical
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structure would be necessary.
A distinct but equally promising avenue for future research is in exploring the mechanism we lay
out in this paper at a disaggregated level, seeking to identify the types of products, or the sectors,
as well as the characteristics of foreign markets, for which correlation of export profitabilities is
likely to be stronger. Here our purpose is to identify only whether there is such a mechanism or
not, and to do so we take the simplistic view that the correlation of export profitabilities across
destinations is the same for all sectors and for all pairs of countries. This is, undeniably, a very
crude approximation. In reality, we should observe instead a matrix of correlations across countries
for each sector. Exploring the structure of those matrices is well beyond the scope of this paper,
but it could prove very useful, making it possible to fine tune the analysis of firms’ export strategies
and the analysis of the impact of trade policies.30 We look forward to advances in those areas.
6 Appendices
Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 2 E0(μ|μ > τ) ≥ E0(μ).
Proof. Integrating both expressions by parts, we find
E0(μ) = μ−
Z τ
μ
G(μ)dμ−
Z μ
τ
G(μ)dμ,
E0(μ|μ > τ) = μ−
Z μ
τ
G(μ|μ > τ)dμ.
Thus,
E0(μ|μ > τ)−E0(μ) =
Z τ
μ
G(μ)dμ+
Z μ
τ
[G(μ)−G(μ|μ > τ)] dμ
=
Z τ
μ
G(μ)dμ+
G(τ)
1−G(τ)
Z μ
τ
[1−G(μ)] dμ ≥ 0,
where the second equality follows from G(u|μ > τ) = R uτ dG(s)1−G(τ) = 11−G(τ) hR uμ dG(s)− R τμ dG(s)i =
1
1−G(τ) [G(u)−G(τ)]. Since τ ∈
¡
μ, μ
¢
implies G(τ) ≥ 0, the inequality follows.
Lemma 3 E0(pq|μ > τ) ≥ E0(pq).
Proof. The left-hand side of the inequality describes the exporter’s expected optimal sales condi-
tional on survival. Recalling that μ ≡ d− c, we can rewrite it in terms of demand (d) and supply
30Elliott and Tian (2009) provide a first step in this direction. Using our data set and empirical methodology, they
evaluate the patterns of sequential exporting of Argentine firms in Asia. They find that China serves as the main
stepping stone for entry in the ten members of the ASEAN free trade bloc. Japan also plays such a role, but the
eﬀect is smaller. Entry in Europe and in the U.S., on the other hand, does not seem to help subsequent entry in
ASEAN.
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(c) shocks as
E0(pq|μ > τ) = E0((d− q)q|μ > τ)
= E0
∙µ
d− E0(μ|μ > τ)− τ
2
¶µ
E0(μ|μ > τ)− τ
2
¶¯¯¯¯
μ > τ
¸
= E0
∙µ
d− E0(d− c| d− c > τ)− τ
2
¶µ
E0(d− c| d− c > τ)− τ
2
¶¯¯¯¯
d− c > τ
¸
=
[E0(d| d > τ + c)]2 − [E0(c| c < d− τ) + τ ]2
4
under the condition that demand and supply shocks are independently distributed. Similarly, we
can express the exporter’s unrestricted expected optimal sales as
E0(pq) = E0 [(d− q)q]
= E0
∙µ
d− E0(μ)− τ
2
¶µ
E0(μ)− τ
2
¶¸
= E0
∙µ
d− E0(d− c)− τ
2
¶µ
E0(d− c)− τ
2
¶¸
=
[E0(d)]2 − [E0(c) + τ ]2
4
.
Now, by Lemma 2 we have that
E0(d| d > τ + c) ≥ E0(d),
since the left-hand side is an expectation truncated at the left of the distribution (given that
assumption μ < τ implies d < τ + c). Proceeding analogously, we also have that
E0(c| c < d− τ) ≤ E0(c).
Therefore,
E0(pq) =
[E0(d)]2 − [E0(c) + τ ]2
4
≤ [E0(d| d > τ + c)]
2 − [E0(c) + τ ]2
4
≤ [E0(d| d > τ + c)]
2 − [E0(c| c < d− τ) + τ ]2
4
= E0(pq|μ > τ),
completing the proof.
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Appendix B: Imperfect correlation in export profitability
We show here that our results generalize to the case of positive but imperfect statistical dependence
between random variables μA and μB. In particular, we emphasize that the third-country result of
Proposition 3 (parts a.2 and b.1) holds in the general case.31
We assume identical distributions G(μA) and G(μB), although this is not essential. Upper-bar
variables denote the counterparts to the variables in the main text under perfect correlation. For
brevity, we denote E
£
μB
¯¯
μA = uA
¤
by E
¡
μB
¯¯
μA
¢
, where uA denotes a particular realization of
the random variable μA.
Output choice Output decisions in A at all times and in B at t = 1 are made in the same way
as in the main text. Output choice in B at t = 2 takes into account the realization of μA. From
the convexity of the max function and Jensen’s inequality,
Z μA
μA
"
max
qB
Z μB
μB
(μB − τB − qB)qBdG(μB
¯¯
μA)
#
dG(μA) ≥ max
qB
Z μB
μB
(μB − τB − qB)qBdG(μB),
where dG(μB) =
R μA
μA dG(μ
B
¯¯
μA)dG(μA). Expected profits are larger when an optimal produc-
tion decision in B is made taking into account the experience acquired in A. By linearity of the
expectation operator, optimal output is qB2 (τ
B) =
E(μB|μA)−τB
2 .
Value of the sequential exporting strategy The conditional expectation of random variable
μB can be expressed as
E
£
μB
¯¯
μA
¤
= EμB + (uA −EμA)
Z μ
μ
∙
− d
du
G
¡
w|μA = uA¢¸¯¯¯¯
u=u0
dw| {z }
≡'
, (22)
where ' captures the statistical dependence between μA and μB.32
At t = 2 the firm enters market B ifÃ
E
£
μB
¯¯
μA = uA
¤
− τB
2
!2
≥ F ⇔ E
¡
μB
¯¯
μA
¢
≥ 2F 1/2 + τB. (23)
Define FB2 (uA; τB) as the F that solves (23) with equality. The firm enters market B at t = 2 if
31Some auxiliary results and the complete proofs for all results in this Appendix are available at
http://www.economics.soton.ac.uk/staﬀ/calvo/documents/Technical_Addendum_1.pdf.
32The proof of this claim rests on a stochastic order based on the notion of regression dependence introduced by
Lehman (1966), and is available upon request. A particular case is when μA and μB follow a bivariate normal distri-
bution with parameters (EμA, EμB, σA, σB , ρ). In that case, ' = ρσBσA and E
?
μB
??μA
?
= EμB + ρσBσA
?
uA −EμA
?
.
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F ≤ FB2 (uA; τB). Plugging (22) in (23) yields
FB2 (u
A; τB) =
µ
EμB +'(uA −EμA)− τB
2
¶2
,
which is strictly decreasing in τB. Comparing FB2 (uA; τB) with its analog under perfect correlation
FB2 (τ
B), defined on page 8, we have that EμA = EμB implies lim
'→1
FB2 (uA; τB) = FB2 (τ
B).
Expressed in t = 0 expected terms, entering market B at t = 2 yields profits
W (τB;F ) ≡
Z μ
μ∗A(')
⎡
⎣
Ã
E
¡
μB
¯¯
μA
¢
− τB
2
!2
− F
⎤
⎦ dG(μA), (24)
where
μ∗A(') ≡
µ
1
'
¶
(2F 1/2 + τB)−
µ
1−'
'
¶
EμB
is the cutoﬀ realization of export profitability in A above which a sequential exporter enters in B
at t = 2.
For expositional clarity, notice that if μA and μB follow a bivariate normal distribution with
parameters (Eμ,Eμ, σ, σ, ρ), the cutoﬀ varies with ' = ρ as follows:
dμ∗A(ρ)
dρ
=
EμB − (2F 1/2 + τB)
ρ2
.
Thus, when EμB > 2F 1/2 + τB the cutoﬀ rises as ρ increases, implying a lower value from experi-
mentation. This simply reflects the fact that, if EμB > 2F 1/2+ τB, it is optimal to enter market B
already at t = 1. Conversely, when EμB < 2F 1/2 + τB the cutoﬀ falls as ρ rises, implying a higher
value from experimentation. This indicates that experimentation becomes more worthwhile as the
statistical dependence between μA and μB increases. Experimentation is most valuable in the case
of perfect correlation assumed in the main text, when it is worth W (τB;F ). Experimentation is
least valuable when μA and μB are independent, when it has no value.33
Choice of export strategy (extension of Proposition 1) As in the main text, FSq is the
fixed cost that makes a firm indiﬀerent between exporting sequentially and not exporting, whereas
FSm makes a firm indiﬀerent between simultaneous and sequential exporting strategies:
FSq : Ψ(τA) +W (τB;FSq) = FSq, (25)
FSm : Ψ(τB)−W (τB;FSm) = FSm. (26)
33Under independence between μA and μB, entry in A conveys no information about profitability in B. Thus, if it
is not worthwhile to enter market B at t = 2, it is not worthwhile entering at t = 1 either. Conversely, if it pays to
enter market B at t = 2, it must pay to enter also at t = 1, to avoid forgoing profits in the first period. Thus, under
independence waiting to enter B at t = 2 is never optimal.
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Since Ψ(τ j) is monotonically decreasing in τ j and τA ≤ τB, and since W (τB;F ) is non-negative,
there is a non-degenerate interval of fixed costs where firms choose the sequential export strategy.
Eﬀects of trade liberalization (extension of Proposition 3) Diﬀerentiating W (τB;F ), we
find
dW (τB;F )
dτB
= −
Z μ
μ∗A(')
Ã
E
¡
μB
¯¯
μA
¢
− τB
2
!
dG(μA)
+
dG(μ∗A('))
'
⎡
⎣
Ã
E
¡
μB
¯¯
μ∗A(')
¢
− τB
2
!2
− F
⎤
⎦
| {z }
=0
< 0,
where the term in brackets is zero by construction of μ∗A('). Using this result and totally diﬀer-
entiating (25) and (26), we have that
dFSm
dτA
= 0;
dFSm
dτB
= −1{Eμ>τB}
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∙³
Eμ−τB
2
´
+
R μ
τB
³
μ−τB
2
´
dG(μ)−
R μ
μ∗A(')
µ
E(μB|μA)−τB
2
¶
dG(μA)
¸
G(μ∗A('))
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
≤ 0;
dFSq
dτA
= −
h
1{Eμ>τA}
³
Eμ−τA
2
´
+
R μ
τA
³
μ−τA
2
´
dG(μ)
i
2−G(μ∗A(')) < 0;
dFSq
dτB
= −
R μ
μ∗A(')
∙µ
E(μB|μA)−τB
2
¶¸
dG(μA)
2−G(μ∗A(')) < 0.
The sign of all derivatives are as in Lemma 1.34 The rest of the proof of parts a.2 and b.1. of
Proposition 3 proceeds analogously. The probability of sequential entry is equivalent except for
the new entry cutoﬀ μ∗A('). Exports vary at the intensive margin as in the main text. Where
intensive margin eﬀects are ambiguous, they are also dominated by extensive margin ones, driven
by the above eﬀects of variable trade costs on fixed cost entry thresholds. Thus, trade liberalization
has positive third-country eﬀects also in the general case of positive statistical dependence between
export profitability in A and B.
34The sign of dF
Sm
dτB when Eμ > τ
B depends on the sign of the numerator. The numerator is negative under perfect
correlation (' = 1), as shown in the main text. It is also negative under independence (' = 0). To see that, notice
that
? μ
μ∗A(')
??
E(μB|μA)−τB
2
??
dG(μA)
????
'=0
= 1{Eμ>2F1/2+τB}
?
Eμ−τB
2
?
. Thus, the expression in square brackets
is minimized when Eμ > 2F 1/2 + τB , but even in that case it remains positive. Invoking a stochastic monotonicity
argument in ', by which
???∂W (τ
B ;F )
∂τB
??? ≥
???∂W (τ
B ;F )
∂τB
??? ,∀' ≥ 0, the numerator keeps its negative sign for any other
degree of non-negative statistical dependence. Therefore, dF
Sm
dτB ≤ 0.
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Figure 4: Growth of Argentina’s Total and Manufacturing Exports, 2000-2007
Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics
There is substantial export growth over our sample period. Figure 4 plots Argentine total and
manufacturing exports since 2000. A dramatic exchange rate devaluation in early 2002 led to a
sharp increase in Argentine aggregate exports (223% from 2002 to 2007). Manufacturing exports,
which account for about 68% of total exports, followed a similar growth trend (220%).
As Table 9 reveals, export growth was similar in most industries. The only relevant change in
the export structure was an increase in Petroleum’s relative share (from 23% in 2002 to 30% in
2007) at the expense of the Automotive and Transport industry’s (17% to 13%).
On the other hand, the distribution of export destinations has changed more significantly during
the sample period. Table 10 shows a growing importance of Mercosur after 2003, accounting for
35% of Argentine exports in 2007, while the participation of Chile and Bolivia has dropped by
almost half in the period, to 10% in 2007. Starting from a low level, the importance of China has
also increased significantly, having more than doubled its share of Argentine exports during our
sample period, to 7%. Meanwhile the United States, non-Mercosur Latin American markets and
the European Union have become relatively less important as destinations for Argentine exports.
Finally, Table 11 displays the share of Argentine exporters that each region accounts for
(columns DS) and the share of new Argentine exporters that each region receives (columns FMS).
The ratio FMS/DS is a proxy for the relative importance of the region as a “testing ground” for
Argentine exporters. Between 2003 and 2007, the most significant change in this ratio happened
for China, which plays a small but increasing role as first destination.
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Table 9: Argentinean Manufacturing Exports by Industry
Industry Exports* Exports* Growth Share Share
2002 2007 (%) 2002 2007
Food, Tobacco and Beverages 4979 10884 219 23 23
Petroleum 4967 13863 279 23 30
Chemicals 1514 3466 229 7 7
Rubber and Plastics 928 1845 199 4 4
Leather and Footwear 829 1144 138 4 2
Wood Products, Pulp and Paper Products 506 998 197 2 2
Textiles and Clothing 533 775 145 2 2
Metal Products, except Machinery 2102 4092 195 10 9
Machinery and Equipment 1127 3137 278 5 7
Automotive and Transport Equipment 3492 5894 169 16 13
Electrical Machinery 385 426 111 2 1
Total Manufacturing 20837 45773 220 100 100
* Million USD
Table 10: Argentinean Manufacturing Exports by Region (%)
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Mercosur 32 25 27 28 32 35
Chile-Bolivia 17 18 16 15 13 10
Rest of the World 16 15 17 17 20 20
North America 15 19 17 18 13 13
EU-27 except Spain-Italy 6 6 5 5 5 5
Central America-Mexico 6 6 7 6 7 6
China 3 6 6 5 5 7
Other South America 3 3 3 3 3 3
Spain-Italy 3 3 3 3 2 2
Table 11: Argentinean Manufacturing First Markets by Region (%)
Region 2003 2007
FMS DS FMS/DS FMS DS FMS/DS
Mercosur 29 24 1.23 36 25 1.44
Chile-Bolivia 20 16 1.26 17 14 1.20
North America 12 9 1.39 9 7 1.32
Spain-Italy 11 7 1.71 8 5 1.45
Rest of the World 8 17 .46 12 20 .61
Central America-Mexico 7 11 .67 4 10 .43
Other South America 7 9 .72 7 10 .69
EU-27 except Spain-Italy 5 7 .74 6 8 .71
China 0 1 .50 2 1 1.52
FMS: share of region j as first export destination by number of firms.
DS: share of region j as export destination by number of firms.
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